CHAPTER—ONE
On Substance and Hypostasis: how the Doctors of the Church derived these terms from Divine Scripture, and that substance denotes what is common to many persons, while hypostasis denotes what is proper to an individual person.
Since, therefore, the array of accusations you had prepared has now, as you see, been dismantled and has vanished, with no trace remaining, desist at last from defending what you desired to advocate. Rather, show forthrightly—if indeed you think you have anything—that which no one could refute. Or will you again appear as a fugitive, shrinking from combat like those who avoid the reproach of defeat? You attempt to veil your audacious assertion of two natures after the ineffable union with clever devices, because you are ashamed of the blasphemy revealed in your own teaching. But now that these matters lie open, you plainly see, according to the prophetic word, that you have "wearied with the length of your way." (Isa 57:10).
But since you judged it fitting, at the outset of your defense, to propose to your listeners a discourse on substance, hypostasis, and nature, I too have deemed it necessary to bring forth, fully and precisely, what is said concerning these terms by divinely inspired Scripture, along with the complete teaching of the holy Fathers—so that those encountering these explanations may clearly grasp the meaning, as well as those who examine both your words and mine.
The term "substance" (οὐσία), then, is expressive of "that which is." It is fitting that we demonstrate clearly the meanings of these terms by citing the statements and language of divine Scripture. For instance, in the voice that came from the person of God the Father to Moses: "I am who I am." And he said, "Say this to the people of Israel, 'I am has sent me to you.'" (Ex 3:14). Likewise, John the Theologian and Evangelist speaks of the Son, the Word who lives and subsists, begotten of the Father before all ages. In his Gospel, he says: "In the beginning was the Word" (Jh 1:1); in his Epistle: "That which was from the beginning" (1 Jh 1:1); and in the Apocalypse: "Who is, and who was, and who is to come" (Rev 1:8). Similarly, Job the wise speaks of the Holy Spirit—who proceeds eternally from God the Father and subsists in hypostasis—when he says: "the spirit of God is in my nostrils" (Job 27:3). This plainly shows that He exists eternally, subsists, and comprehends all creation, and that in Him we live, move, and have our being.
Therefore, the mystagogues of the divine Church have defined the Holy Trinity as one substance, transcending all. For if the Father is, and the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is, and if their being, their dignity, and their eternity are all one and the same, then certainly their substance is also one and the same. The name οὐσία (substance) clearly derives from the verb "to be." This term is thus not unscriptural, as the pitiful and chilling little sermons of the Arians yelp, but is in fact known and indeed quite familiar in divine Scripture.
As for "hypostasis", in the sense of indicating existence, it is synonymous with substance. Just as "substance" implies "being," so also "hypostasis" implies subsistence. Now, "being" and "subsisting" are not different from one another. Thus God is introduced speaking through the prophet Jeremiah: "f they had stood in my council (hypostasis ὑποστάσει)" 1 (Jer 23:22). The same one who said, "I am who I am", also said, "If they had stood in My hypostasis"—thereby signifying that He who is and who subsists has always existed and never ceased to be.
Likewise, the term "existence" (ἐξουσία) also denotes "being" and "subsisting." Indeed, there is no distinction between being, subsisting, and existing. Thus, the psalmist prays: "God will hear and humble them—He who exists from before the ages" (Ps 54:20 LXX). Accordingly, substance, hypostasis, and existence are interchangeable insofar as they all refer to being; yet in other respects, they are greatly distinct and differentiated.
The greek word used for "council" in Jeremiah 23:22 is "ὑποστάσει," which has its transliterated translation as "hypostasis."
For substance is also indicative of a genus or category encompassing many species, while hypostasis is a certain limitation that indicates one specific form, that is, a person, not sharing its properties with those of the same genus, but containing a distinctive subject marked by unique characteristics. Existence, too, can refer either to a general genus (like substance) or to a particular, defined instance (like hypostasis).
Let us now illustrate this with a clear example, fitting to our present inquiry. The term "man" is a generic term, indicating the whole human nature, as when God in the Book of Genesis says to Noah and his sons: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image." (Gen 9:6). Here, "man" does not denote a single individual, but rather the whole human race, since the law applies equally to all. This is because all of us were made equally in the image of God, endowed uniquely among all living beings on earth with a rational, free, and noble soul, capable of wisdom, justice, and other such virtues by which we may imitate God.
No one can say that a rational and intelligent soul belongs to one person but not to another. All of us equally possess an intellective faculty and a rational soul; hence, we are said to be made "in the image of God." To exist without and intellect, and to be led by mere sensation, is proper to beasts, not to humans. Similarly, when the prophet Isaiah says, "All flesh is, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field" (Isa 40:6), he encompasses the whole human race in the word "man." He points to the earthly origin of the flesh, its corruptibility and mortality—how, like the, it springs up in a day and withers. This applies equally to all humanity, just as Job says: "Remember that thou hast made me of clay; and wilt thou turn me to dust again?" (Job 10:9), and again: "Man that is born of a woman is of few days" (Job 14:1).
No one differs from his neighbour in this regard. That is why Elihu says to Job: "I am formed of clay, just as you are; we were both made from the same substance" (Job 33:6). In the same way, Job says again: "Death is a rest for man" (Job 3:13)—here referring to every person, since death is the common end of all.
From these Scriptural statements, we can also derive a definition of man: a rational, mortal animal, capable of understanding and knowledge. And this definition includes every man—no human being lies outside it. For every man is necessarily rational, mortal, and capable of intellect and knowledge. Thus, as we said before, the term "man" signifies substance, indicating the commonality, equality, identity, and shared nature of the entire human race.
But if someone mentions Job or Elkanah, the father of Samuel, the specific name designates—so to speak with precision—one man, this one or that, and his unique hypostasis. As soon as one hears the name "Job," one understands that a human being is meant—but not all human beings, only one individual, a specific man within the general substance of humanity. The particular name does not allow the hearer's mind to generalise toward the full extent of "substance" or include all humans, but rather restrains and narrows the understanding to the one hypostasis in question, indicating his distinct attributes separately.
CHAPTER—TWO
That the term nature is used at times to mean substance in the common and generic sense, and at other times to mean hypostasis and a single person.
Now let the above suffice concerning substance and hypostasis. But the term "nature" (natura) is likewise used in two different ways: sometimes it is taken in the common and generic sense—just as "substance" is—while at other times it is used for a specific individual or particular subject, just like hypostasis. And now, please consider as a clear and exact witness to this assertion none other than Saint Cyril, though, in truth, we could adduce many such testimonies from other wise doctors of the Church as well. For he writes, in his Fourth Tome Against the Blasphemies of Nestorius, the following: Cyril: "For One indeed is the Nature of the Godhead, but the Father exists in His Proper mode and the Son too and likewise the Spirit." And again, shortly after: Cyril: "For One Nature of Godhead is conceived of in the Holy and Consubstantial Trinity." In these statements, he clearly uses the term nature in the sense of substance and as a common notion. However, in his Epistle to the Empresses, which begins with the words "The adornment of the world", he employs the term nature to signify a specific hypostasis, writing: Cyril: "We say that He was begotten ineffably from the substance of God the Father—the Only-Begotten Word, the Maker of the ages, through whom and in whom all things were made; the true Light, the life-giving nature, for Life appeared as from the Life, the Father. In the last days of this age, when the Father willed to save the human race—fallen into a curse, plunged into death and corruption through sin—He took hold of the seed of Abraham, as it is written, and shared in flesh and blood, that is, He became man." Here, then, the Only-Begotten Word, the one hypostasis of the Son—one of the Trinity—is plainly called the "life-giving nature".
Thus, the word nature is used to mean a single hypostasis. This usage is also evident in Saint Alexander, bishop of the God-loving city of Alexandria and president of the renowned Council of the 318 Fathers. In his encyclical letter to the bishops against Arius and his followers, he makes this clear, saying: Alexander: "They fill their heads with everything that has anything to do with Christ's suffering, humiliation, emptying of himself, and so-called poverty [Phil 2:7-8]. They present those passages to disprove his eternal existence and divinity and at the same time forget all those passages that prove his glory and nobility and presence with the Father, for example, "I and the Father are one" [John 10:30]. Note what the Lord says. He does not proclaim himself to be the Father or say that the two natures are one in hypostasis [οὐδὲ τὰς τῇ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις μίαν εἶναι σαφηνίζων]. He states that the Son of the Father accurately presents the likeness of the Father. He says that his nature took the exact likeness of his Father in every way, and that his image is indistinguishable from the father's; he is like an exact stamp of the original." From this, we must observe carefully how this holy doctor refers to the two hypostases of the Father and the Son as two natures, using the term nature in its proper, specific sense. Yet he also knew that the term nature is often used for substance, not just for hypostasis. Moreover, this usage is not confined only to divinity but also applies to humanity. For the term nature is sometimes used in a substantial or generic sense, and at other times in a particular or personal sense, signifying a single hypostasis. Indeed, the term nature is used for substance and the whole human race, as the wise Cyril demonstrates in his Third Tome Against the Blasphemies of Nestorius, writing: Cyril: "He was delivered up because of our transgressions (not because of His own, far from it, for confessedly has the nature of man been borne down by the transgression in Adam unto curse and death, it is moreover sick of proneness to sin in the flesh), in order that the righteousness of the Law might be fulfilled in its who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit." Here, it is clear that "human nature" refers to the whole human race, to the generic nature common to all.
St. Cyril of Alexandria, Five Tomes Against Nestorius, Book Four, trans. P.E. Pusey, LFC 47 (Oxford 1881), 128
Ibid, 135-136
And as for the case where nature is again used to signify a hypostasis, we have already cited the testimony of Saint Cyril in his writings against the objections of the impious Andrew regarding the eighth anathema, where he writes: Cyril: "When the discussion has considered closely what elements have come together to become, or to compose, the single person and nature, or concrete existence, then it may use either of the terms, "together with" or "with," because it has already secured what it denotes and has thereby defined it as a single composite entity rather than dividing it into a duality." Here again, it is evident that nature is used to refer to one person and one hypostasis. But when the Doctor says that "for confessedly has the nature of man been borne down by the transgression in Adam unto curse and death", he uses the term nature to mean the common human nature, the entire human race. Therefore, we must conclude that the term "nature" at times signifies substance, and at other times signifies hypostasis.
St Alexander of Alexandria, Letter to Alexander of Byzantium, GCS 44:8-25
St. Cyril of Alexandria, Five Tomes Against Nestorius, Book Three, trans. P.E. Pusey, LFC 47 (Oxford 1881), 121-122
St. Cyril of Alexandria, Three Christological Treatises, A Defense of the Twelve (Eighth) Anathemas Against the Bishops of the Diocese of Oriens, trans. Daniel King, Fathers of the Church 129 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 158
CHAPTER—THREE
The term existence (existentia), like nature (natura), holds a middle position, being used both to signify a common notion and an individual entity.
Thus, existentia can signify both substance and hypostasis and is, in this sense, a mediating term—it may refer to either, depending on the underlying intention. This is immediately shown in brief by Saint Athanasius, who writes to the bishops of Africa: "For hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) and substance (οὐσία) are existence (ὕπαρξις); for they are and exist (ὑπάρχει)." And in his Oration on the Saving Manifestation of Christ, he takes existence to mean the generic notion, that is, substance, when arguing against those who support the errors and impious imagination of Apollinaris: "And what benefit is there for humanity in these things, unless the Lord had appeared in the identity of existence and nature, and in the newness of nature, as the Apostle said: 'He renewed for us a new and living way,' saying, 'I am the way, the life, and the truth'?" But you claim salvation comes by imitation and likeness, not by renewal and firstfruits; yet Christ became the firstborn among many brothers and the firstfruits of those who sleep, who is the head of the Church's body." Again, in his Letter on the Holy Spirit, he writes: "It is not a Trinity in name alone and in linguistic expression, but in truth and actual existence. For just as the Father is "He Who Is," [Ex 3.4] so too is his Word "He Who Is" and God over all [Rom 9.5]. And the Holy Spirit is not without existence, but exists and subsists truly. And the Catholic Church does not entertain the thought of anything less than these [three] lest she fall to the level of Sabellius and today's Jews, who take after Caiaphas. Nor does she conceive of anything more than these [three] lest she slip into Greek polytheism." We also find the wise Cyril using the term existence in many places to mean proper hypostasis.
In Book VII of his Commentary on the Gospel of John, he writes: "Indeed, we confess that the Holy Trinity exists in proper existences, for the Father is Father and not the Son, and likewise the Son is Son and not the Father, and the Holy Spirit is properly the Holy Spirit. Yet they do not depart from mutual unity and communion. Nor do we imagine these Persons as separate from one another like bodies, but we believe they exist in one substance and unity of nature beyond all controversy. Nevertheless, each remains distinctly what he is, incomprehensibly contained in himself according to the property of each hypostasis and person. Thus, we perceive one divinity in the holy and consubstantial Trinity." And again, in Book VII of his Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, Cyril says of the same mystery: "The Holy Trinity is known in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit; but the naming of each one of those numbered does not denote part of the Trinity, but the whole absolutely. For God is indivisible and simple. He is distinguished in existences, names, and persons according to the constitution of each, but the unity of nature joins them in one glory, dignity, and worship, for there is one divinity for us." The wise Basil, too, in his Refutation of the Arrogant and Impious Eunomius, uses existence to mean proper hypostasis when he says that the name "Unbegotten" signifies a certain mode of existence, not substance. For that name does not express what the Father is in substance, but rather His manner of existing, signifying that He is not from another, but exists innascibly. He even presses this point to its conclusion by writing: "If the impossible is the opposite of the possible, and the foolish the opposite of the wise, and all things that are opposed are contraries, then the unbegotten is the opposite of the begotten. Therefore, the Father is contrary to the Son in substance, if being unbegotten refers not to a mode of existence, but to substance itself."
St. Athanasius of Alexandria, Letter to the Bishops of Africa, CPG 2133, 4.3 (https://www.fourthcentury.com/athanasius-on-nicaea-2/#Ad-Afros)
St. Athanasius of Alexandria, Letter to Serapion 1.28.3–1.28.4, in Works on the Spirit by Didymus the Blind and Saint Athanasius the Great, trans. Mark DelCogliano, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, and Lewis Ayres, Popular Patristics Series 43 (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011)
Saint Cyril, moreover, used existence not only with reference to the divinity but also to our humanity, speaking of hypostasis in his Second Tome Against the Blasphemies of Nestorius, who claimed that the Word of God and the man born of Mary were united only by adhesion and by equality of dignity, madly asserting that such dignity produced sonship. Cyril writes: "You ignorantly call adhesion equality of dignity. But what kind of adhesion is this? Don't you know that those in the world rejoice in worldly honours, and that when people are given titles by princes, though they may share the same rank, they remain distinct in individual existence—indeed, they remain separate even while thinking and acting alike?" See how wisely this teacher of piety stated that men who hold the same rank of dignity may still be distinguished by individual existence, that is, by their own proper hypostasis. For they are not separated by generic existence, since all men share the same substance. Therefore, like nature, the term existence sometimes signifies substance and sometimes hypostasis.
This portion is a fragment preserved in St. Severus himself.
St. Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, trans. Mark DelCogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 87
St. Cyril of Alexandria, Five Tomes Against Nestorius, Book Two, trans. P.E. Pusey, LFC 47 (Oxford 1881), 48-47
CHAPTER—FOUR
A hypostasis, whether simple or composite, is also called a person when it subsists individually according to its own constitution; but for those things which exist in composition without change or confusion, it is impossible for each to be assigned its own person, since one hypostasis is constituted from two.
We know that the term "person" has been used by the mystagogues of the holy Church to signify hypostasis; and this was set forth in the testimonies previously given—since Basil, writing to Amphilochius concerning the Holy Trinity, said that "so that, throughout the whole, both the oneness is preserved in the confession of the one Godhead and the individuality of the Persons is confessed in the separation of the distinctive characteristics understood in each." and the holy Cyril, in the seventh book of his exposition on the Gospel of John, said, "we believe they exist in one substance and unity of nature beyond all controversy. Nevertheless, each remains distinctly what he is, incomprehensibly contained in himself according to the property of each hypostasis and person." Likewise, Gregory the Theologian, in his oration on the Holy Lights, clearly teaches the same, saying: "But when I say 'God,' be illumined with one light and three lights: three, according to the properties or hypostases—or, if one prefers to call them so, according to the persons (for we are not contending over names, so long as the words lead to the same meaning); and one, according to the of substance or divinity." The name 'person' as applied to the Trinity was thus taken to signify the accurate character of the distinct and non-confused or unmingled nature of the three hypostases, not so that we imagine a human form or ultimately a bounded, shaped image to represent that incorporeal, unshaped, and supremely exalted substance.
For we hear Paul speaking to the crowds in Athens in the Acts of the Apostles, saying that "we ought not to think that the Godhead is like gold, or silver, or stone, sculpted by art and the imagination of man"; for it is beyond every movement of intellect and thought and bodily imagination. Concerning each human being, and referring to hypostasis as person, we already cited the holy Cyril, in his writings against the impious Andrew, who criticized the eighth chapter; offering his defense, Cyril says that "indeed, when there is talk of one person and nature, or one hypostasis, the one speaking, considering the elements from which the thing naturally is or is composed, adds the preposition with (σύν) or through (διά), and thus preserves the signified reality as one according to composition, and does not define it as two separately. But when hypostases are divided beforehand into two, and thus the preposition with (σύν) is used as though they were separate, then this signifies two or many, not one according to composition. For example, if I say that the soul of a man is honored along with his body, when honor is shown to a single human being composed of both, or if someone says that the soul of a man is one living being along with his own body—this in no way defines two human beings but rather shows knowledge of the elements from which the human is composed. But when I say, 'Peter and John are called men,' or, 'Peter went up to the temple along with John,' the preposition with (σύν) no longer indicates one man. For Peter is not composed with John, nor are both together in the constitution of one man." Why then do they who scheme against the truth divide this one into two Christs? Therefore, from what has been said and shown, it must be understood that hypostasis signifies a proper person when it subsists in distinct subsistence, whether it be simple—as is the case with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (for we have heard how Doctor Cyril, in his exposition on the Gospel of Matthew, spoke of the separation of existences, that is, of hypostases and persons and names according to their proper constitution)—or composite, as in the case of Peter or John, who subsist from soul and body, perfectly constituted according to their own proper reason. For both Peter and John subsist in their proper constitution.
St. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, Letter 236, trans. Sister Agnes Claire Way, Fathers of the Church 28 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 171
Again, we heard the word of the Doctor stating that Peter is not composed with John, nor are both together in one human hypostasis, even if it is said that one goes up to the temple with the other, or that they are jointly called apostles. Therefore, when soul and body, from which one man is constituted, retain their own hypostasis without confusion—since neither is changed into the other, as they subsist in composition and not in singular subsistence—they are not assigned their own person; rather, what is constituted from them manifests one hypostasis and one person. So too, Emmanuel, composed from divinity and humanity—that is, from human flesh animated with a rational soul—perfectly constituted according to its own nature, is one person by concurrence, without change or confusion, from the two into one. The Word of God retains his own hypostasis—that is, his divinity—older than all ages, without alteration; and the humanity which he united to himself inexplicably in his hypostasis remains likewise unchanged. For it is not possible that to each of these—the divinity of the Only-Begotten and the humanity united to him—there be assigned a distinct person, since they appear in composition and do not subsist separately in the property of subsistence, nor are they found distinct, but through the fitting and incomprehensible union between them, one hypostasis results from both, and consequently one person, that is, of the incarnate Word. The Word, indeed, existed eternally and incorporeally before the ages, but in the last days, out of compassion, was united to flesh endowed with a rational soul, so that he might be acknowledged as corporeal for the sake of the economy, though according to the divine substance he remains incorporeal and incomprehensibly encompasses and fills all things, as only he himself, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, knows.
Moreover, that in a composite being, such as Emmanuel or any man, the elements of which he is composed remain in their own hypostasis without change, and are not each assigned a distinct person—whereas those things that subsist in their own proper subsistence are, because of their separate hypostases, also defined as distinct persons—is clearly seen if we listen attentively to the wise rebuke of Saint Cyril against Nestorius, who divided the one Christ into two natures or hypostases and deceitfully claimed to confess one person of both, since both supposedly share one dignity and the one name of Sonship. Cyril, correcting him as one unlearned, teaches that it is not possible for hypostases which have not come together into one through natural union but subsist in their own subsistence to have one person, but that they are two and are called two persons, even if they share one rank and one dignity. In the second tome against the blasphemies of this fool, Cyril says that various impious formulations are used to try to show that the generation of the Only-Begotten according to the flesh could not have occurred otherwise than by some confusion or mingling of hypostases, although the Doctors of the Church did not hand this down to us mystically. Rather, we say that a true union was made, with the Word uniting the body to himself, while remaining what he was. But this man, having no part in such doctrines, strayed into utter impiety by separating Christ into two persons and into two entirely distinct hypostases, assigning to each separately the sayings that pertain to him; and again he calls Jesus Christ our one Lord, as though he were a man joined to God merely by dignity, not by true union, that is, not by a natural union. How, then, can he be one Christ and Son and Lord, if both are separately designated and truly are what they are called, while their hypostases are not united naturally but only by dignity or authority or power? But when we investigate the nature of things, we will not see that those which are equal in dignity have thereby lost their distinct property of subsistence; nor will equality of glory suffice to effect union. For example: Peter and John were both apostles and saints and were adorned with equal honors and virtues by Christ the Savior of all through the Spirit, for they heard among other things, "You are the light of the world," and also, "Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons." But would we say that, because of their equal dignity and authority, they are to be considered one man, and that this suffices for union—that union which pertains to hypostasis? How could anyone think such a thing and not be rightly judged utterly foolish?
Therefore, where hypostases subsist separately, they are also separated into two persons, and to each of them, as subsisting in the property of subsistence, Cyril attributes a proper person; but where they are joined together through a natural union, without confusion or mingling, they do not remain as two, but form from both one hypostasis and one person, precisely because, as the Doctor says, they no longer subsist in the property of individual subsistence. Indeed, in the third tome against the blasphemies of Nestorius, Cyril writes, "If the hypostases, as you say, are divided into two and exist separately and individually, how can there be a coming together into one person?" Similarly, in his Prosphonetical Oration to the most devout Emperor Theodosius, Cyril said: "I beg you, do not separate or divide, after the union, Emmanuel into man and the Word of God, so as to imagine him as having two persons." And in his Scholia, he wrote: "Although the Word came into true union with humanity, the hypostases remained without confusion; yet we do not say there are two persons, for they came together into a true union, and do not subsist in the property of individual subsistence." 21 Therefore, also in the third synodical letter to Nestorius, Cyril said: "Let us assign all the words of the Gospel to one person, to the one hypostasis of the incarnate Word: for there is one Lord Jesus Christ, as it is written." Thus, in summary: substance signifies commonality and the generic idea; hypostasis, however, represents one distinct subject, which we also call a person, when it subsists in the property of individual subsistence, whether it is simple or formed from a composition brought into indivisible union. But to the things from which it is composed, even if they are retained without confusion, no proper person is assigned, since they do not subsist separately but in composition. For how could distinct personhood be assigned to things which, by an indivisible concurrence, bring forth one person and one hypostasis? We acknowledge that nature and subsistence are one and the same, though at times the term is used for substance, and at other times for hypostasis.
CHAPTER—FIVE
That hypostasis is sometimes properly called substance, and that it is indeed so called by the doctors of the Church.
Having thus distinguished these terms and, as far as possible, clarified their force and meaning for our contemplation, it must be known that the eminent doctors of the holy churches have often used the name "substance" for what is properly called hypostasis. See, I pray, the Spirit-filled Basil, who in the first of his homilies against the impious Eunomius writes the following: "Our Lord Jesus Christ, in the words he spoke about himself, when signifying to humanity both the mercy of his divinity and the grace of the economy, used this mode of speech through various expressions—calling himself the door, the way, the bread, the vine, the shepherd, and the light. Not that he possesses many natures, for not all the names converge upon the same meaning—for light means one thing, and vine another—but because, being one and the same according to subject and being one simple and entirely uncompounded substance, he names himself differently according to the diverse thoughts of those he addresses, accommodating the names to them. For according to the diversity of operations and in relation to those who receive his benefits, he assigns to himself different titles." Thus, Christ is said to be one simple and entirely uncompounded substance—that is, one hypostasis of the Only-Begotten Word, who was simple in the nature of his divinity before he emptied himself and was united to humanity for the sake of the saving economy. For Basil was contending with the impure Eunomius over the hypostasis of the Word of God, considered in itself and in separation. Nor is it surprising that Basil referred to Christ in this way, since before the incarnation, he was indeed simple and uncompounded.
For the Synod of the 318 holy Fathers, divinely instructed, did the same when they composed for us the definition of the true faith, saying: "We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father, that is, from the substance of the Father." And although the name "Jesus Christ" in no way applied to him when he was begotten of the Father before the ages—for that name is new and acquired, given to him because of the incarnation—the Fathers did not speak so carelessly, nor did they confuse theology with the economy. Rather, with careful precision they used these new names when speaking of his eternal generation, to signify that he who existed before the ages and he who appeared in the last times was not two, but one and the same: the same one, first without flesh, and in later times incarnate from Mary and called Jesus Christ. For these names have their origin and cause in the economy, as Saint Cyril also teaches in his writings against the impious Diodore, saying: "It is clearly understood that before he became man, the one who is from God the Father—the Word—was not called Christ or Jesus by anyone. For 'Christ' signifies anointing, while 'Jesus' is a name clearly given by the angelic voice before conception in the holy Virgin to him who was born from her according to the flesh." The same teaching is found in his writings to the most pious queens, where he says: "When the Word was made flesh, then it is said that he was called Christ Jesus." Moreover, in the second oration against Eunomius, the God-bearer Basil himself also seems to call the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten a substance, writing thus: "The begotten is called and is the image, the Son; for he is the radiance of the glory of God, and the wisdom and power and justice of God—not as a habit or quality, but as a natural and operative substance; and he is the radiance of the glory of God because he shows the whole Father in himself, shining forth from all his glory." And John, the bishop of Constantinople, who pours forth spiritual rivers from his intellectual heart and abundantly expresses them through his tongue, writes in the fourth homily of his exposition on the Gospel of John: "This Word is a hypostatic substance, which proceeded from the Father without passion.
For, as I said before, that was signified by the appellation 'Word.'" Therefore, the doctors of orthodoxy called the divinity of Christ—that is, the proper hypostasis of the Only-Begotten—a substance; and they often also called his humanity by the name substance—that is, his flesh endowed with soul and mind, which he made his own in the economy when he was united to it hypostatically. This can be immediately seen from what Saint Cyril wrote in his second letter to Succensus: "For if, after saying 'one nature of the Word,' we had remained silent and not added 'incarnate,' it might indeed have furnished a plausible occasion to ask with pretense: 'Where is the perfection of humanity? Where also does the substance of one like us subsist?' But since both the perfection in humanity and the indication of our substance were introduced by our saying 'incarnate,' let them cease leaning on a reed." 29 It is thus acknowledged from this as well that this one flesh, animated with a rational soul and united hypostatically to the Word, has also been clearly called a substance, because the name substance is sometimes taken by the doctors from its proper signification.
CHAPTER—SIX
That these impious men wrongly and foolishly imagine a duality of natures after the union, due to the distinction between the divinity and humanity, according to substance, of which Emmanuel is composed.
Now that these matters have been reviewed with uncontroversial testimonies and placed before the audience, let us see how this diligent Grammarian constructs a defence of the innovations made at Chalcedon. He writes: "Let us turn our discourse to those who slander the holy synod of Chalcedon and to those who do not say there are two natures or two substances in Christ. First, let us ask them: is the nature, that is, the substance of divinity, corporeal or incorporeal? Clearly, they will say it is incorporeal—unless they have strayed from sound reasoning. Again, we ask them: What is the nature of the flesh? And it is evident that they will confess it to be a body, for it can be touched, and whatever is tangible is a body. Then how is it that the Son of God, after the dispensation, is of one substance and is acknowledged to be in perfect divinity and perfect humanity?" You once again persist in these absurdities and foolish accusations, which you placed at the beginning of your little book. For whom among us—something I have often stated—have you accused of thinking, that is, raving, that the divinity of the Only-Begotten and the flesh taken from the Virgin Mary, which is consubstantial with us, rationally animated, and united to the Word, constitute one single substance? Whom will you entangle with the threads from which the spider's web is woven—traps in which you hallucinate you will catch flies, when in fact even beetles do not get caught, and such threads break instantly due to their extreme frailty, let alone withstand the touch of a human hand? Perhaps beetles, irrational creatures, would be more suited to fight with you, since you utter such childish and weak things.
For Scripture tells somewhere of God arming even beetles in battle against the Amorites, who fought against Israel, perhaps judging that slaying such impious men was unworthy of real warriors, and by this very thing He taught the Amorites to know their own weakness (cf. Josh. 24:12). So also your foolish and Amorite-like arguments are worthy of beetles, since through impiety they fight against the Israel of God. What do you hope to achieve by claiming, as if by irrefutable logic, that because the nature of flesh can be touched but the Word of God cannot, I, too, divide Emmanuel into two natures? Will you really lead into captivity those who oppose you by the subtle fraud of your arguments, tying their hands behind their backs and forcing them to think as you do? Know clearly that you have strayed from the truth and fight in vain, as in a dream. For even when it is rightly believed by all that the divinity of the Only-Begotten is intangible and incorporeal, while the flesh is palpable, solid, consubstantial with us, and possessed of a rational soul, even then Emmanuel appears as one from two natures—divinity and humanity—each perfect according to its own reason, and thus one incarnate nature of the Word of God, which stands opposed to any division of those natures, a thing the Council of Chalcedon did not confess. Therefore, show that the synod confessed these things, and stop proceeding with vain, senseless words that wander off the path. Do not forget—despite your frequent quoting of the letter to Succensus—that it proclaims one Lord Jesus Christ from two natures and also one incarnate nature of the Word of God, which are comprehensive formulas for the indivisible incarnation. Saint Cyril insisted on and handed down these expressions, but the Council of Chalcedon omitted them, not out of ignorance, for it knew them, though it met resistance, and eventually yielded to the power of impiety. When bishops were pressured by the emperors to write down what pleased the times and impiety, they cried, "No one composes another creed; the things laid out at Nicaea suffice," and they cited the canon forbidding the writing of another faith (cf. Canon 7 of Ephesus). 31 Yet when the necessity grew stronger, they wrote—though against the canon—what was still in agreement with the truth, for it was in no way fitting to add anything small or great to a faith already complete and perfect.
Nevertheless, having written this, they were pressured again to move on to another creed. And those who applied pressure did not cease until they had dissected Christ and defined Him as being in two natures. And when part of the things Saint Cyril wrote to Succensus are quoted, we read: "We see two natures united with one another through an indivisible union, without confusion or change: for the flesh is flesh and not divinity, even if it became the flesh of God; likewise, the Word is God and not flesh, although He made flesh His own according to the dispensation. Therefore, when we understand this, we do not harm that unity by saying He is made from two natures; but after the union, we do not divide the natures nor separate the one and indivisible Son into two Sons, but say there is one Son and, as the Fathers said, one incarnate nature of the Word of God." Now, explain to us, O clever defender of the Council of Chalcedon—you who recite the letters to Succensus with nothing but your throat's voice, as if this alone makes you orthodox and frightens the simple—where is the agreement of the Council of Chalcedon's words with those of Cyril, the most diligent interpreter of divine doctrines? Where is the phrase "from two natures"? Where is the confession of "one incarnate nature of the Word of God," as the Fathers said? Be zealous for these Fathers; seek their words; and when you do not find them in the writings of Chalcedon, acknowledge the fight against the truth and stop deceiving yourself by striving with lies, as it is written in Proverbs, "He who labors to deceive himself feeds on the wind and pursues vanity" (cf. Prov. 12:11 LXX), and forgets the paths of his own field, walking in a barren wilderness, and fights into the void, since no one comes to meet him hand to hand, and he takes up worn-out weapons which dissolve by themselves, thinking them strong weapons. And because the divinity of Emmanuel is incorporeal and spiritual, while the flesh is sensible and touchable, do you suppose you have gained a basis to divide that one indivisible being into two natures and to define Him so? What other led you to the foolish question: "Which of these? Is God touchable, or is the body untouchable?"
CHAPTER—SEVEN
That all heretics who divide the one Christ into two bring forward the same senseless questions, asserting the substantial difference between divinity and humanity as the cause of division.
Diodorus too employed these same empty questions and, by them, paved the way for division, as the wise Cyril exposed thus: DIODORUS: "Is He who is from David's seed one of the gods? Is not the Word of God from the substance of the Father, and He who is from David's seed from the substance of David?" So what then did the eminent herald of truth say, explaining the cause of such cold and senseless questions, which is division? CYRIL: "Thus, although the Word is truly from the substance of the Father, and the flesh is from the seed of David, and both are true—we do not deny it—although we do not separate the Only-Begotten from the substance of God the Father, nor the flesh from the substance of David, yet we know that the divine evangelist John clearly wrote: 'And the Word was made flesh' [Jn 1:14]. Now the Word was made flesh, not by being changed into flesh—since His nature is beyond change—but by uniting that flesh to Himself in an ineffable way, so that now one Son is recognized and called Jesus Christ the Lord, not, as Diodorus said, because He added to Himself some servant, as if divided into a duality of sons." He also wisely confronted Nestorius with these same well-known and empty questions, who was rushing toward duplicity and thought thereby to prepare a division of the economy and a separation of the union. In the third book against his vile blasphemies, Cyril closes off his arguments in this way: CYRIL: "Why then do you violently remove the wisdom of the economy, so that it is considered not fittingly fashioned, when you say: 'Was the divinity the seed of Abraham? Did He, according to His divinity, have brothers like Himself?' [Heb 2:16; Mt 12:50] Is this not plainly absurd?
For to ask such things ineptly and drive that which is pure and right into blasphemy—things that pertain to the understanding of the economy in Christ—is nothing else but the clearest sign of the worst kind of madness!" And in the fifth book, when Nestorius pursued division using common arguments and said, like your wisdom, "For divinity is not found by touch," he offers the remedies that heal these mad questions: CYRIL: "But unless the Word became palpable and visible, having a body subject to touch and sight, how were the wise disciples observers of the Word made flesh? How do they say they have seen and handled the Word of life, which was with the Father and appeared to us?" 36 [1 Jn 1:1–2]. It was indeed this one—palpable and visible, the one who was nailed to the wood—that Thomas recognised and rightly confessed as God and Lord, saying immediately: 'My Lord and my God' [Jn 20:28]. These same answers we offer to your clever and unanswerable question, and if you are angered because we confess one Christ and one nature of the incarnate Word, and so you flee to slander and accuse us of a mixture and a kind of blending of flesh with divinity—foolishly and impossibly claiming we think both are of the same substance—you have, in fact, already above, abundant explanations that remove this empty suspicion. But because you present Cyril's letters to Succensus as a kind of shield to frighten your opponents—like those who stand in games for show and then immediately cast aside the weapons—we will not reproach you for discarding them like a coward, but urge you instead to lift up that same shield and, protected by it, turn its blows on yourself and launch the arrows of accusation. For I will now bring forth from the very heart of that shield what is found in its central, strongest part—although it would be enough to call the whole shield like iron, since in no part can the arrows of the adversaries pass through it. Nevertheless, read these things with the eyes of your mind and stop repeating the same empty slander: CYRIL: "For 'one' is said not only of things that are simple by nature, but also of those that are composed by union—like man, who is made of soul and body.
These are different in kind and not consubstantial with each other, yet when united, they form one human nature, even if in the nature of the composition, there is a difference between the elements brought into unity. Therefore, those who say that if the nature of the incarnate Word is one, then necessarily and absolutely there must be confusion and blending—as if the human nature were diminished or subtracted—are speaking superfluously. For it has neither been diminished nor, as they claim, subtracted; it is sufficient for full demonstration that He has become man to say: 'He was incarnate'. If this were left unspoken by us, their slanders might have some basis; but since it is necessarily added, where is there any room for diminution or subtraction?" So why, O good sir, did you ignore what was shown to you: how the elements from which Emmanuel is formed are not blended into one and the same substance? And like ignorant and ridiculous doctors, you enter on your own into those who are healthy, even when they drive you away from their gates; and you heap abuse upon the holy words of Cyril, misapplying them out of season, and from his very letters to Succensus you proclaim that it is impossible for that body from the earth to undergo a transformation into divinity! And now, just as those who suffer from madness, when driven by impulse, are controlled and fully handed over to the frenzy possessing them, unable to return to themselves—so also you, not by necessity as they are, but by your own will, restraining your earlier impulse, prolong your argument in vain and try to prove what is already acknowledged: that what is created and uncreated, what is made and not made, what is temporal and eternal, are not of the same substance. And though no one disputes this, you bring forward a multitude of testimonies from the holy Fathers. To this, it is fitting to say what was said by one of the prophets: "Woe to him who multiplies what is not his own! How long? And to him who loads himself with thick clay—for suddenly they shall rise up who will bite you" [Hab 2:6–7]. For how long shall we endure you as you vainly reinforce such bonds, before we rise up and bite you with those very things written to Succensus?
For they are twisted by your hands, they fall useless from your mouth, and, rising up against you, they will bite you with strong bites so that even your dullness may be struck, when you ask: "Which of these? Is the same thing intangible and touchable, that which is perceived by the senses and that which is spiritual?" CYRIL: "These are indeed different in kind and not consubstantial with each other, but when united, they complete one human nature, even if in the rationale of the composition there remains the natural difference between the things brought into unity. Therefore, those who say that if the nature of the incarnate Word is one, there must be confusion and blending, with the human nature being diminished or subtracted, are speaking superfluously. For it has not been diminished, nor, as they claim, subtracted; it is enough for full demonstration that He has become man to say: 'He was incarnate'. If this were left unspoken, there might be some place for their slander; but since it is necessarily added, where is there any place for diminution or subtraction?" Likewise, the words of the holy herald, apostle, and bishop of the Roman Church, Julius, will bite you when they are brought forward. For such are the spiritual bites of rational dogs, who, once from the unclean nations and as if from dogs, have been designated by God's grace and keep watch over the flock of Christ our Savior, barking against every strange and false voice; their tongues were often dipped in the noble blood of martyrdom when the time required it, as David sings [Ps 58:7, 597], and having thus honored the divine blood that redeemed us all from sin, they were truly dipped and raised up to imitate those eight bites which the wise Micah foretold [Mic 5:5], stirred up against the spiritual Assyrian—that is, against Satan. These, of course, were the mouths of the divine apostles, who signified the power of the eighth day on account of the resurrection and confirmed that resurrection with the testimony of the prophets, who fed Israel and were guided by the seventh, the sabbath shadow of the law, and foretold the evangelical teaching of the eighth and Lord's Day through legal types.
And from these apostles, when the strong man—Satan—was bound, as the Saviour said [Lk 11:22], his vessels were taken from him by Jews and Gentiles; for Micah foretold that seven shepherds and eight bites of men would rise up against him [Mic 5:5]. But now is the time to hear the bites of Julius, who, in the discourse titled "On the union in Christ of the body with the divinity of the Word of God," wrote thus: JULIUS: "It is proclaimed that this indeed is created in union with the uncreated, and that is uncreated in conjunction with the created, one nature subsisting from both parts, with the Word also carrying out the particular operation in the whole with divine perfection; whereas in a common man, from two imperfect parts, one nature is completed and designated by a single name—since even the whole is called 'flesh' without the soul being removed, and likewise the whole is called 'soul' without removing the body, even though each is distinct from the other. Therefore, God is unmingled, the Lord above human generation even though He was born of a woman; and He is Lord, even though made like servants; and spirit, even though shown as flesh according to the union with the body; not merely a man, as Paul said [Gal 1:1], though He is also proclaimed a man by Himself; and to speak absolutely, the invisible God has been revealed in visible body, the uncreated God made manifest in created form, emptying Himself in the form of a servant [Phil 2:7], yet not emptied nor changed nor diminished in divine substance: for no change takes place in the divine nature, nor is it diminished nor increased." Having heard this, will you then dare to bring your ridiculous questions to him who wrote these things, and sharply ask whether the created and uncreated, the visible and the invisible, are the same according to substance? Yet the very thing your absurd questions try to challenge has been answered—you have heard how in Christ, the uncreated and the created are proclaimed and acknowledged as joined and united, one nature subsisting from both, and one hypostasis of the incarnate Word of God. For they are not of one and the same substance, as you, drunken with your own slanders, deliriously claim—numbering yourself among those of whom the divine prophet Amos says: "They drank wine bought with fines in the house of their God" [Am 2:8]. This is truly the worst kind of drunkenness: that you rave about such things in the house of God and in the Church, becoming—as much as you can—a tempter leading the faithful away from sound doctrine. But if you were merely explaining something from your childish instruction, I would remain silent, following the advice of the wise Paul: "For what have I to do with judging those outside?" [1 Cor 5:12].
CHAPTER—EIGHT
Among the orthodox teachers, it is one and the same to confess "one nature of the incarnate Word of God" and to say that Christ is "one nature," that is, one hypostasis composed of divinity and humanity without confusion.
Since you attempt to distort ecclesiastical doctrine by asking whether we, who believe correctly, confess both the created and uncreated in Christ, we gladly refer you to the words of Pope Julius: "In Him is proclaimed the created in union with the uncreated, and the uncreated in conjunction with the created—one nature existing from both" (cf. Julius, fragm.). To confess one nature formed of the union of created and uncreated is the same as affirming "one nature of the incarnate Word." St. Cyril also defends this view, saying that when speaking of one person and one nature or hypostasis, the prepositions "with" (σύν) or "through" (μετά) show compositional unity and not separation into two (cf. Cyril, Anathematism 8). In That Christ is One, Cyril writes: "We say He is one Son and one nature, even though He was made man, assuming a rational soul. His humanity became His own, and we understand Him as God and man together." This affirms—not denies—the confession of "one nature of the incarnate Word of God," showing the agreement of the Fathers that to speak of Christ's composite nature is the same as speaking of the one incarnate nature. You should have examined Cyril's words in his second letter to Succensus, which explains that this ineffable union, free from confusion, is perceived by refined contemplation to include two elements, yet these do not remain as two after union. They do not subsist separately, but as one hypostasis, one person, and one nature of the incarnate Word (cf. Luke 6:10; Acts 26:32; Ps 102:15; Ps 51:9). Just as in man the soul and body are two natures perceived only in thought, so too in Emmanuel we perceive divinity and humanity in intellect alone. After union, they are not divided, and what once were two are now one undivided nature, one hypostasis, one person. Why then, when asked to contemplate these distinctions only in thought, do you persist in claiming two natures after the union, as the Council of Chalcedon did—of which you now appear to be a new and willing champion?
CHAPTER—NINE
Rebuke of the impious, who slander the statement of Gregory the Wonderworker condemning the claim that Christ is one person composed of two natures — as if it were fabricated.
You did not heed Gregory the Wonderworker, who clearly taught that to confess two natures in Christ is to turn the Trinity into a quaternity, even though the wise Basil, in his writings on the Holy Spirit to Amphilochius, judged Gregory's words worthy to be ranked alongside the apostles. Gregory declared: "He is true God, without flesh, yet revealed in flesh, perfect in true divine perfection—not two persons nor two natures; for we do not worship four: God, the Son of God, man, and the Holy Spirit. We anathematize those who impiously add man separately into the doxology. We affirm the Word became man for our salvation, to make us partakers of the heavenly image, that we might be deified like the true Son of God according to nature, and according to the flesh the Son of Man, our Lord Jesus Christ." Yet I hear you dispute this, claiming the text is corrupted because it uses the term consubstantial, which you say no one used before the 318 Fathers of Nicaea. But you should have read Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Gregory, which states his faith came by revelation from John the Evangelist and the Virgin Mary, in which it is said: "There is nothing created or introduced into the Trinity," proving that Gregory taught and understood the consubstantial Trinity. Go to Pontus and Cappadocia, and the churches there will confirm this creed. Furthermore, St. Athanasius refuted your ploy when he wrote to the bishops of Africa, affirming that even earlier bishops of Rome and Alexandria condemned those who denied the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Eusebius of Caesarea also admitted that some ancient bishops and writers used the term. So how do you, in opposing such clear testimony, think to escape God's judgment, He who, as Paul says, "catches the wise in their craftiness" (1 Cor 3:19)? Or haven't you heard David's words about you: "They said: the Lord shall not see" and "The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain" (Ps 93:7,11)? But even if, as you claim, these words were not from Gregory, why dismiss them, when they agree with those of Cyril and Julius, apostles and great doctors? What help, then, do you hope for from deceit and false reasoning, when many voices and witnesses say the same in harmony and clarity?
CHAPTER—TEN
A Disputation against those who presumptuously and impiously claim that saying "one incarnate nature of the Word of God" is the same as saying "two united natures," based on the apostolic words of Athanasius.
Now let Athanasius, that shining star of the Church of Alexandria, approach these people—he of whom, I believe, the Apostles would not have cast lots had they wished to add someone to the number of their twelve-crowned band. For they would have found no one worthy to be compared with him, much less to surpass him, just as they once chose between Matthias and Joseph called Justus when seeking to replace Judas, who had fallen. So fully and abundantly did he live by the same Spirit as they did—dying daily, bearing in his body the dying of Jesus, never permitting himself rest, freely disregarding even his own blood, but never once neglecting, even in the smallest letter or stroke, the word of piety—just as the Lord had said—for he considered that this would close the kingdom of heaven to him. For this reason, Gregory the Theologian rightly called his teachings "the law of orthodoxy." Such, then, was this herald of piety. And in his writings on the Incarnation of the Word, he wrote as follows: ATHANASIUS: "We confess that He is the Son of God and God according to the Spirit, but the Son of Man according to the flesh—not two natures, one of which is the Son to be worshiped and the other not to be worshiped, but one nature of the Word of God made flesh, to be worshiped together with His flesh in one act of adoration. Nor do we say there are two Sons—one, truly the Son of God and worthy of worship, and the other, a man born of Mary who is not to be worshiped and became a Son of God only by grace, as other men are—but we proclaim that this very One is the Son of God and God, and that He Himself, not someone else, was also born of Mary in the flesh at the end of days, as the angel said to the Mother of God, Mary, when she asked, 'How shall this be, since I do not know a man?' The angel replied: 'The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow you.
Therefore the holy one who is born shall be called the Son of God.'" What could be clearer than these definitions and manifest, unambiguous doctrines, which declare that we must proclaim and worship one nature of the Word of God made flesh, especially since they first decisively rejected and condemned the expression: "Not two natures, one Son—one to be worshiped and the other not." Indeed, duality breaks union. And necessarily, the human nature ends up being considered unworthy of adoration, being divided from the Word of God according to nature. Someone may object: "But I say the natures are united! Saying 'two united natures' is the same as saying 'one composite nature.'" But look carefully, dear friend, at how the Doctor clearly ruled out such phrasing: "Not two natures, one Son." Union, both in nature and in hypostasis (person), leads us to say: "One incarnate nature of the Word of God," —not simply, through verbal persuasion, "two natures united." For how, if there is an inseparable union made from two natures, could it ever follow that we should go back to saying "two natures"? That is utterly impossible. If it were possible, the wise Athanasius would not have said plainly and without exception: "Not two natures, one Son," but would rather have said: "Not two separate natures, one Son, but two united and individual natures." But these are not the words of Athanasius—he knew, having Christ speaking in him, that the one who is made up of two is not two, but one according to hypostasis. Even though, when considered in subtle contemplation, our mind sees as distinct the two elements that have come together—divinity and humanity—yet, once we reflect upon their union, this reflection on the union reveals one who is composed of both, and does not allow our mind to remain in the thought of separation. And this is exactly what St. Cyril says to Nestorius in the second tome against his blasphemies: "Stop dividing the natures after the union"—that is, after one has reflected on the union. For, says he, although you may perceive—by means of subtle distinction—that the two united things are distinct (for that is what union is: the joining of two or more things—for to say that one is united to itself is nonsense), yet do not think of them as two also according to hypostasis.
For there is one hypostasis from the two, and one nature of the Word made flesh. If Cyril had permitted the phrase "two united natures" even after one has considered the union, he would not have written, in his second letter to Succensus: "So that those two natures are no longer two, but both together are completed as one living being." He takes as an analogy the human being like us, as an example of the ineffable union recognised in Emmanuel. And neither would the great Athanasius have decreed, without any exception, as we have already quoted: "Not two natures, one Christ." We must, therefore, recognise only the difference of the elements that were united, but after reflecting upon the union, we must reject any division or separation into duality. Thus, St. Cyril says somewhere in the second tome of what he wrote against the blasphemies of Nestorius: CYRIL: "I too concede the great difference and distinction between divinity and humanity. For, in their essential mode of being, they are utterly distinct and seem to share no likeness whatsoever. But when the mystery of the union in Christ is brought before us, the of union does not ignore the distinction, but it excludes division. Not because it confuses or blends the natures into one, but because the Word of God, having partaken of flesh and blood, is now understood and called one Son, even in this manner."
CHAPTER—ELEVEN
That one must confess the divinity and humanity, different in substance from one another, from which the one Christ exists, and avoid the division of duality after the union; and that to say the one Christ is "from two natures" is not the same as impiously saying He is "in two natures."
It is necessary to confess that the divinity and humanity from which the one Christ is constituted are distinct in substance from one another, and to flee the division of duality after the union; and moreover, it is not the same to say that the one Christ is "from two natures" as to impiously say that He is "in two natures." Indeed, up to the point of considering the difference according to nature between those things that have been joined into one, it is permissible for the subtle intellect to distinguish between the two from which a perfect natural union has arisen; but to persist further in the separation leads us into positing two persons and two sons. Nestorius, who confessed two sons, did not hesitate to present the two united natures. Immediately observe the wise and prudent Cyril! In the prosphonetical oration to the most pious Emperor Theodosius, he says: CYRIL: "Not distinguishing what belongs to the nature of the Word and of the flesh, nor wishing to rest in the differences that relate solely to this point—for in this they would not be mistaken in judgment, since the nature of the flesh is not the same as that of divinity—but rather establishing the one (the man) properly and individually, and the other (God) according to nature and truth: even though they wish to be called Christians." Therefore, he permits that someone, for the sake of recognising the difference of the things united, may in subtle contemplation, distinguish those things that are united. But if anyone remains in duality after the union, to the extent that he even says this one, according to hypostasis, is two natures—with the intention of setting forth man and God separately, Cyril rebukes those who so confess. For, as we have learned, the Doctor says, "the union does not ignore difference, but it excludes division." How then do we avoid division?