The Stromata, or Miscellanies

For we have, as the source of teaching, the Lord, both by the prophets, the Gospel, and the blessed apostles, “in divers manners and at sundry times,” leading from the beginning of knowledge to the end. But if one should suppose that another origin was required, then no longer truly could an origin be preserved. He, then, who of himself believes the Scripture and voice of the Lord, which by the Lord acts to the benefiting of men, is rightly [regarded] faithful. Certainly we use it as a criterion in the discovery of things. What is subjected to criticism is not believed till it is so subjected; so that what needs criticism cannot be a first principle. Therefore, as is reasonable, grasping by faith the indemonstrable first principle, and receiving in abundance, from the first principle itself, demonstrations in reference to the first principle, we are by the voice of the Lord trained up to the knowledge of the truth. For we may not give our adhesion to men on a bare statement by them, who might equally state the opposite. But if it is not enough merely to state the opinion, but if what is stated must be confirmed, we do not wait for the testimony of men, but we establish the matter that is in question by the voice of the Lord, which is the surest of all demonstrations, or rather is the only demonstration; in which knowledge those who have merely tasted the Scriptures are believers; while those who, having advanced further, and become correct expounders of the truth, are Gnostics. Since also, in what pertains to life, craftsmen are superior to ordinary people, and model what is beyond common notions; so, consequently, we also, giving a complete exhibition of the Scriptures from the Scriptures themselves, from faith persuade by demonstration. And if those also who follow heresies venture to avail themselves of the prophetic Scriptures; in the first place they will not make use of all the Scriptures, and then they will not quote them entire, nor as the body and texture of prophecy prescribe. But, selecting ambiguous expressions, they wrest them to their own opinions, gathering a few expressions here and there; not looking to the sense, but making use of the mere words. For in almost all the quotations they make, you will find that they attend to the names alone, while they alter the meanings; neither knowing, as they affirm, nor using the quotations they adduce, according to their true nature. But the truth is not found by changing the meanings (for so people subvert all true teaching), but in the consideration of what perfectly belongs to and becomes the Sovereign God, and in establishing each one of the points demonstrated in the Scriptures again from similar Scriptures. Neither, then, do they want to turn to the truth, being ashamed to abandon the claims of self-love; nor are they able to manage their opinions, by doing violence to the Scriptures. But having first promulgated false dogmas to men; plainly fighting against almost the whole Scriptures, and constantly confuted by us who contradict them; for the rest, even now partly they hold out against admitting the prophetic Scriptures, and partly disparage us as of a different nature, and incapable of understanding what is peculiar to them. And sometimes even they deny their own dogmas, when these are confuted, being ashamed openly to own what in private they glory in teaching. For this may be seen in all the heresies, when you examine the iniquities of their dogmas.

For when they are overturned by our clearly showing that they are opposed to the Scriptures, one of two things may be seen to have been done by those who defend the dogma. For they either despise the consistency of their own dogmas, or despise the prophecy itself, or rather their own hope. And they invariably prefer what seems to them to be more evident to what has been spoken by the Lord through the prophets and by the Gospel, and, besides, attested and confirmed by the apostles. Seeing, therefore, the danger that they are in (not in respect of one dogma, but in reference to the maintenance of the heresies) of not discovering the truth; for while reading the books we have ready at hand, they despise them as useless, but in their eagerness to surpass common faith, they have diverged from the truth. For, in consequence of not learning the mysteries of ecclesiastical knowledge, and not having capacity for the grandeur of the truth, too indolent to descend to the bottom of things, reading superficially, they have dismissed the Scriptures. Elated, then, by vain opinion, they are incessantly wrangling, and plainly care more to seem than to be philosophers. Not laying as foundations the necessary first principles of things; and influenced by human opinions, then making the end to suit them, by compulsion; on account of being confuted, they spar with those who are engaged in the prosecution of the true philosophy, and undergo everything, and, as they say, ply every oar, even going the length of impiety, by disbelieving the Scriptures, rather than be removed from the honours of the heresy and the boasted first seat in their churches; on account of which also they eagerly embrace that convivial couch of honour in the Agape, falsely so called. The knowledge of the truth among us from what is already believed, produces faith in what is not yet believed; which [faith] is, so to speak, the essence of demonstration. But, as appears, no heresy has at all ears to hear what is useful, but opened only to what leads to pleasure. Since also, if one of them would only obey the truth, he would be healed. Now the cure of self-conceit (as of every ailment) is threefold: the ascertaining of the cause, and the mode of its removal; and thirdly, the training of the soul, and the accustoming it to assume a right attitude to the judgments come to. For, just like a disordered eye, so also the soul that has been darkened by unnatural dogmas cannot perceive distinctly the light of truth, but even overlooks what is before it. They say, then, that in muddy water eels are caught by being blinded. And just as knavish boys bar out the teacher, so do these shut out the prophecies from their Church, regarding them with suspicion by reason of rebuke and admonition. In fact, they stitch together a multitude of lies and figments, that they may appear acting in accordance with reason in not admitting the Scriptures. So, then, they are not pious, inasmuch as they are not pleased with the divine commands, that is, with the Holy Spirit. And as those almonds are called empty in which the contents are worthless, not those in which there is nothing; so also we call those heretics empty, who are destitute of the counsels of God and the traditions of Christ; bitter, in truth, like the wild almond, their dogmas originating with themselves, with the exception of such truths as they could not, by reason of their evidence, discard and conceal.

As, then, in war the soldier must not leave the post which the commander has assigned him, so neither must we desert the post assigned by the Word, whom we have received as the guide of knowledge and of life. But the most have not even inquired, if there is one that we ought to follow, and who this is, and how he is to be followed. For as is the Word, such also must the believer’s life be, so as to be able to follow God, who brings all things to end from the beginning by the right course. But when one has transgressed against the Word, and thereby against God; if it is through becoming powerless in consequence of some impression being suddenly made, he ought to see to have the impressions of reasons at hand. And if it is that he has become “common,” as the Scripture says, in consequence of being overcome the habits which formerly had sway by over him, the habits must be entirely put a stop to, and the soul trained to oppose them. And if it appears that conflicting dogmas draw some away, these must be taken out of the way, and recourse is to be had to those who reconcile dogmas, and subdue by the charm of the Scriptures such of the untutored as are timid, by explaining the truth by the connection of the Testaments. But, as appears, we incline to ideas founded on opinion, though they be contrary, rather than to the truth. For it is austere and grave. Now, since there are three states of the soul—ignorance, opinion, knowledge—those who are in ignorance are the Gentiles, those in knowledge, the true Church, and those in opinion, the Heretics. Nothing, then, can be more clearly seen than those, who know, making affirmations about what they know, and the others respecting what they hold on the strength of opinion, as far as respects affirmation without proof. They accordingly despise and laugh at one another. And it happens that the same thought is held in the highest estimation by some, and by others condemned for insanity. And, indeed, we have learned that voluptuousness, which is to be attributed to the Gentiles, is one thing; and wrangling, which is preferred among the heretical sects, is another; and joy, which is to be appropriated to the Church, another; and delight, which is to be assigned to the true Gnostic, another. And as, if one devote himself to Ischomachus, he will make him a farmer; and to Lampis, a mariner; and to Charidemus, a military commander; and to Simon, an equestrian; and to Perdices, a trader; and to Crobylus, a cook; and to Archelaus, a dancer; and to Homer, a poet; and to Pyrrho, a wrangler; and to Demosthenes, an orator; and to Chrysippus, a dialectician; and to Aristotle, a naturalist; and to Plato, a philosopher: so he who listens to the Lord, and follows the prophecy given by Him, will be formed perfectly in the likeness of the teacher—made a god going about in flesh. Accordingly, those fall from this eminence who follow not God whither He leads. And He leads us in the inspired Scriptures. Though men’s actions are ten thousand in number, the sources of all sin are but two, ignorance and inability. And both depend on ourselves; inasmuch as we will not learn, nor, on the other hand, restrain lust. And of these, the one is that, in consequence of which people do not judge well, and the other that, in consequence of which they cannot comply with right judgments.

For neither will one who is deluded in his mind be able to act rightly, though perfectly able to do what he knows; nor, though capable of judging what is requisite, will he keep himself free of blame, if destitute of power in action. Consequently, then, there are assigned two kinds of correction applicable to both kinds of sin: for the one, knowledge and clear demonstration from the testimony of the Scriptures; and for the other, the training according to the Word, which is regulated by the discipline of faith and fear. And both develop into perfect love. For the end of the Gnostic here is, in my judgment, twofold,—partly scientific contemplation, partly action. Would, then, that these heretics would learn and be set right by these notes, and turn to the sovereign God! But if, like the deaf serpents, they listen not to the song called new, though very old, may they be chastised by God, and undergo paternal admonitions previous to the Judgment, till they become ashamed and repent, but not rush through headlong unbelief, and precipitate themselves into judgment. For there are partial corrections, which are called chastisements, which many of us who have been in transgression incur, by falling away from the Lord’s people. But as children are chastised by their teacher, or their father, so are we by Providence. But God does not punish, for punishment is retaliation for evil. He chastises, however, for good to those who are chastised, collectively and individually. I have adduced these things from a wish to avert those, who are eager to learn, from the liability to fall into heresies, and out of a desire to stop them from superficial ignorance, or stupidity, or bad disposition, or whatever it should be called. And in the attempt to persuade and lead to the truth those who are not entirely incurable, I have made use of these words. For there are some who cannot bear at all to listen to those who exhort them to turn to the truth; and they attempt to trifle, pouring out blasphemies against the truth, claiming for themselves the knowledge of the greatest things in the universe, without having learned, or inquired, or laboured, or discovered the consecutive train of ideas,—whom one should pity rather than hate for such perversity. But if one is curable, able to bear (like fire or steel) the outspokenness of the truth, which cuts away and burns their false opinions, let him lend the ears of the soul. And this will be the case, unless, through the propensity to sloth, they push truth away, or through the desire of fame, endeavour to invent novelties. For those are slothful who, having it in their power to provide themselves with proper proofs for the divine Scriptures from the Scriptures themselves, select only what contributes to their own pleasures. And those have a craving for glory who voluntarily evade, by arguments of a diverse sort, the things delivered by the blessed apostles and teachers, which are wedded to inspired words; opposing the divine tradition by human teachings, in order to establish the heresy. For, in truth, what remained to be said—in ecclesiastical knowledge I mean—by such men, Marcion, for example, or Prodicus, and such like, who did not walk in the right way? For they could not have surpassed their predecessors in wisdom, so as to discover anything in addition to what had been uttered by them; for they would have been satisfied had they been able to learn the things laid down before.

Our Gnostic then alone, having grown old in the Scriptures, and maintaining apostolic and ecclesiastic orthodoxy in doctrines, lives most correctly in accordance with the Gospel, and discovers the proofs, for which he may have made search (sent forth as he is by the Lord), from the law and the prophets. For the life of the Gnostic, in my view, is nothing but deeds and words corresponding to the tradition of the Lord. But “all have not knowledge. For I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren,” says the apostle, “that all were under the cloud, and partook of spiritual meat and drink;” clearly affirming that all who heard the word did not take in the magnitude of knowledge in deed and word. Wherefore also he added: “But with all of them He was not well pleased. ” Who is this? He who said, “Why do you call Me Lord, and do not the will of My Father? ” That is the Saviour’s teaching, which to us is spiritual food, and drink that knows no thirst, the water of gnostic life. Further it is said, knowledge is said “to puff up. ” To whom we say: Perchance seeming knowledge is said to puff up, if one suppose the expression means “to be swollen up. ” But if, as is rather the case, the expression of the apostle means, “to entertain great and true sentiments,” the difficulty is solved. Following, then, the Scriptures, let us establish what has been said: “Wisdom,” says Solomon, “has inflated her children. ” For the Lord did not work conceit by the particulars of His teaching; but He produces trust in the truth and expansion of mind, in the knowledge that is communicated by the Scriptures, and contempt for the things which drag into sin, which is the meaning of the expression “inflated. ” It teaches the magnificence of the wisdom implanted in her children by instruction. Now the apostle says, “I will know not the speech of those that are puffed up, but the power;” if ye understand the Scriptures magnanimously (which means truly; for nothing is greater than truth). For in that lies the power of the children of wisdom who are puffed up. He says, as it were, I shall know if ye rightly entertain great thoughts respecting knowledge. “For God,” according to David, “is known in Judea,” that is, those that are Israelites according to knowledge. For Judea is interpreted “Confession. ” It is, then, rightly said by the apostle, “This Thou, shall not commit adultery, Thou shall not steal, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is comprehended in this word, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself . ” For we must never, as do those who follow the heresies, adulterate the truth, or steal the canon of the Church, by gratifying our own lusts and vanity, by defrauding our neighbours; whom above all it is our duty, in the exercise of love to them, to teach to adhere to the truth. It is accordingly expressly said, “Declare among the heathen His statutes,” that they may not be judged, but that those who have previously given ear may be converted. But those who speak treacherously with their tongues have the penalties that are on record. Chapter XVII. —The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.

Those, then, that adhere to impious words, and dictate them to others, inasmuch as they do not make a right but a perverse use of the divine words, neither themselves enter into the kingdom of heaven, nor permit those whom they have deluded to attain the truth. But not having the key of entrance, but a false (and as the common phrase expresses it), a counterfeit key ( ἀντικλεῖς ), by which they do not enter in as we enter in, through the tradition of the Lord, by drawing aside the curtain; but bursting through the side-door, and digging clandestinely through the wall of the Church, and stepping over the truth, they constitute themselves the Mystagogues of the soul of the impious. For that the human assemblies which they held were posterior to the Catholic Church requires not many words to show. For the teaching of our Lord at His advent, beginning with Augustus and Tiberius, was completed in the middle of the times of Tiberius. And that of the apostles, embracing the ministry of Paul, ends with Nero. It was later, in the times of Adrian the king, that those who invented the heresies arose; and they extended to the age of Antoninus the elder, as, for instance, Basilides, though he claims (as they boast) for his master, Glaucias, the interpreter of Peter. Likewise they allege that Valentinus was a hearer of Theudas. And he was the pupil of Paul. For Marcion, who arose in the same age with them, lived as an old man with the younger [heretics]. And after him Simon heard for a little the preaching of Peter. Such being the case, it is evident, from the high antiquity and perfect truth of the Church, that these later heresies, and those yet subsequent to them in time, were new inventions falsified [from the truth]. From what has been said, then, it is my opinion that the true Church, that which is really ancient, is one, and that in it those who according to God’s purpose are just, are enrolled. For from the very reason that God is one, and the Lord one, that which is in the highest degree honourable is lauded in consequence of its singleness, being an imitation of the one first principle. In the nature of the One, then, is associated in a joint heritage the one Church, which they strive to cut asunder into many sects. Therefore in substance and idea, in origin, in pre-eminence, we say that the ancient and Catholic Church is alone, collecting as it does into the unity of the one faith—which results from the peculiar Testaments, or rather the one Testament in different times by the will of the one God, through one Lord—those already ordained, whom God predestinated, knowing before the foundation of the world that they would be righteous. But the pre-eminence of the Church, as the principle of union, is, in its oneness, in this surpassing all things else, and having nothing like or equal to itself. But of this afterwards. Of the heresies, some receive their appellation from a [person’s] name, as that which is called after Valentinus, and that after Marcion, and that after Basilides, although they boast of adducing the opinion of Matthew [without truth]; for as the teaching, so also the tradition of the apostles was one.

Some take their designation from a place, as the Peratici; some from a nation, as the [heresy] of the Phrygians; some from an action, as that of the Encratites; and some from peculiar dogmas, as that of the Docetæ, and that of the Hærmatites; and some from suppositions, and from individuals they have honoured, as those called Cainists, and the Ophians; and some from nefarious practices and enormities, as those of the Simonians called Entychites. Chapter XVIII—The Distinction Between Clean and Unclean Animals in the Law Symbolical of the Distinction Between the Church, and Jews, and Heretics. After showing a little peep-hole to those who love to contemplate the Church from the law of sacrifices respecting clean and unclean animals (inasmuch as thus the common Jews and the heretics are distinguished mystically from the divine Church), let us bring the discourse to a close. For such of the sacrifices as part the hoof, and ruminate, the Scripture represents as clean and acceptable to God; since the just obtain access to the Father and to the Son by faith. For this is the stability of those who part the hoof, those who study the oracles of God night and day, and ruminate them in the soul’s receptacle for instructions; which gnostic exercise the Law expresses under the figure of the rumination of the clean animal. But such as have neither the one nor the other of those qualities it separates as unclean. Now those that ruminate, but do not part the hoof, indicate the majority of the Jews, who have indeed the oracles of God, but have not faith, and the step which, resting on the truth, conveys to the Father by the Son. Whence also this kind of cattle are apt to slip, not having a division in the foot, and not resting on the twofold support of faith. For “no man,” it is said, “knoweth the Father, but he to whom the Son shall reveal Him. ” And again, those also are likewise unclean that part the hoof, but do not ruminate. For these point out the heretics, who indeed go upon the name of the Father and the Son, but are incapable of triturating and grinding down the clear declaration of the oracles, and who, besides, perform the works of righteousness coarsely and not with precision, if they perform them at all. To such the Lord says, “Why will ye call me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say? ” And those that neither part the hoof nor chew the cud are entirely unclean. “But ye Megareans,” says Theognis, “are neither third, nor fourth, Nor twelfth, neither in reckoning nor in number,” “but as chaff which the wind drives away from the face of the earth,” and as a drop from a vessel. ” These points, then, having been formerly thoroughly treated, and the department of ethics having been sketched summarily in a fragmentary way, as we promised; and having here and there interspersed the dogmas which are the germs of true knowledge, so that the discovery of the sacred traditions may not be easy to any one of the uninitiated, let us proceed to what we promised.

Now the Miscellanies are not like parts laid out, planted in regular order for the delight of the eye, but rather like an umbrageous and shaggy hill, planted with laurel, and ivy, and apples, and olives, and figs; the planting being purposely a mixture of fruit-bearing and fruitless trees, since the composition aims at concealment, on account of those that have the daring to pilfer and steal the ripe fruits; from which, however, the husbandmen, transplanting shoots and plants, will adorn a beautiful park and a delightful grove. The Miscellanies, then, study neither arrangement nor diction; since there are even cases in which the Greeks on purpose wish that ornate diction should be absent, and imperceptibly cast in the seed of dogmas, not according to the truth, rendering such as may read laborious and quick at discovery. For many and various are the baits for the various kinds of fishes. And now, after this seventh Miscellany of ours, we shall give the account of what follows in order from another commencement. Elucidations I. (Deception, cap. ix. p. 538 . ) More and more, the casuistry exposed by Pascal in the Provincial Letters becomes an important subject for the investigation of Americans. Nobody who has any pretensions to scholarship can afford to be ignorant of these letters; for they belong to literature, and not merely to theology. But they belong in a sense to the past; not that “the Society of Jesus” has ceased to maintain all that Pascal has exposed, and to practice even worse, but that the Latin churches have, since the days of Pascal, been formally subjected to a system of casuistry, in some respects superficially reformed, but in all other respects radically bad, and corrosive to society. In Pascal’s day this casuistry could only be charged upon individuals, and upon societies and communities: the Roman Church everywhere adopted it, but was not formally committed to it. But in the system of Liguori this corrupt morality has been made authoritative and dogmatic; so that in all the Latin churches it becomes the base of the confessional. For moral purposes, it is the Bible of the millions who resort to their confessors and “directors. ” These remarks, however, are here introduced merely with reference to the morals of Clement with regard to truth. I have briefly indicated, in the footnotes, the points which are to be noted in forming an opinion of our author’s conceptions of this vital principle. They seem to me conformed to the Gospel; to the teachings of Him who allows no hair-splittings, but says, “Let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay. ” But, as the text stood in the Edinburgh translation, it did injustice to Clement in one passage, which I have modified. It reads, “He (the Gnostic) both thinks and speaks the truth, unless, at any time, medicinally, as a physician for the safety of the sick, he may lie, or tell an untruth. ” To this, Clement adds significantly, “according to the Sophists. ” That is to say, our author tolerates the Christian who has not got beyond the Sophists with respect to benevolent deceptions. As killing is not always murder, so some, even among stern moralists, have maintained that deception by word of mouth is not always lying. This is the extent to which Clement tolerates sophistry, and he goes on to demand the practice of truth in Gospel terms. Now, thank God, the English word “lie” is always infamous; and there is nothing like it, in this respect, in other languages.

The Sophists themselves did not so understand the Greek word ( ψεῦδος ), when they apply it to the benevolent deception of a physician, or to the untruths used benevolently with the insane. Nothing infamous attaches to the French word mensonge when used for what are deemed “innocent deceptions. ” With this whole system of sophistry I have no patience at all; but, in justice to the Sophists, let us not make them worse than they were. They did not understand that such deceptions were lies. Hence, for “lie,” I have used the word deceive, correcting a needless rendering of the text, and one to which Clement should not be made to extend even a contemptuous toleration. In this respect, the holy Jeremy Taylor and Dr. Johnson go further than Clement, and seem to allow that benevolent deceptions may be innocent. Sanderson sustains a sterner morality, and is more generally accepted. Liguori’s system is verbally as strong as the Gospel itself: lying is a mortal sin, and never justifiable. But, when he comes to the definition of a lie, it is made so feeble, that the worst liar that ever lived need never resort to it. He may practice all manner of subterfuge, and even perjury, without telling a lie. As, e. g. , if he points up his sleeve, while he swears that he did not see the criminal there, he tells no lie: it is the business of the judge and jury to watch his fingers, etc. II. (True Gnostic, cap. x. p. 540, note 1 . ) This unfortunate word Gnostic hides the force of Clement’s teaching, throughout this work. Here he virtually expounds it, and we see that it refers even more to the heart than to the head. It carries with it the conduct of life by knowledge; i. e. , by “the true Light which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. ” (See p. 607 , footnote. ) III. (The Scriptures, cap. xvi. p. 550 , note 3. ) The Primitive Fathers never dream of anything as dogma which cannot be proved by the Scriptures, save only that the apostolic traditions, clearly proved to be such, must be referred to in proving what is Holy Scripture. It is not possible to graft on this principle the slightest argument for any tradition not indisputably apostolic, so far as the de fide is concerned. Quod semper is the touchstone, in their conceptions, of all orthodoxy. No matter who may teach this or that, now or in any post-apostolic age, their test is Holy Scripture, and the inquiry, Was it always so taught and understood?

The Stromata, or Miscellanies. Book VIII. Chapter I. —The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth. But the most ancient of the philosophers were not carried away to disputing and doubting, much less are we, who are attached to the really true philosophy, on whom the Scripture enjoins examination and investigation. For it is the more recent of the Hellenic philosophers who, by empty and futile love of fame, are led into useless babbling in refuting and wrangling. But, on the contrary, the Barbarian philosophy, expelling all contention, said, “Seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you; ask, and it shall be given you. ” Accordingly, by investigation, the point proposed for inquiry and answer knocks at the door of truth, according to what appears. And on an opening being made through the obstacle in the process of investigation, there results scientific contemplation. To those who thus knock, according to my view, the subject under investigation is opened. And to those who thus ask questions, in the Scriptures, there is given from God (that at which they aim) the gift of the God-given knowledge, by way of comprehension, through the true illumination of logical investigation. For it is impossible to find, without having sought; or to have sought, without having examined; or to have examined, without having unfolded and opened up the question by interrogation, to produce distinctness; or again, to have gone through the whole investigation, without thereafter receiving as the prize the knowledge of the point in question. But it belongs to him who has sought, to find; and to him to seek, who thinks previously that he does not know. Hence drawn by desire to the discovery of what is good, he seeks thoughtfully, without love of strife or glory, asking, answering, and besides considering the statements made. For it is incumbent, in applying ourselves not only to the divine Scriptures, but also to common notions, to institute investigations, the discovery ceasing at some useful end. For another place and crowd await turbulent people, and forensic sophistries. But it is suitable for him, who is at once a lover and disciple of the truth, to be pacific even in investigations, advancing by scientific demonstration, without love of self, but with love of truth, to comprehensive knowledge. Chapter II. —The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition. What better or clearer method, for the commencement of instruction of this nature, can there be than discussion of the term advanced, so distinctly, that all who use the same language may follow it? Is the term for demonstration of such a kind as the word Blityri , which is a mere sound, signifying nothing? But how is it that neither does the philosopher, nor the orator,—no more does the judge,—adduce demonstration as a term that means nothing; nor is any of the contending parties ignorant of the fact, that the meaning does not exist? Philosophers, in fact, present demonstration as having a substantial existence, one in one way, another in another. Therefore, if one would treat aright of each question, he cannot carry back the discourse to another more generally admitted fundamental principle than what is admitted to be signified by the term by all of the same nation and language. Then, starting from this point, it is necessary to inquire if the proposition has this signification or not. And next, if it is demonstrated to have, it is necessary to investigate its nature accurately, of what kind it is, and whether it ever passes over the class assigned.

And if it suffices not to say, absolutely, only that which one thinks (for one’s opponent may equally allege, on the other side, what he likes); then what is stated must be confirmed. If the decision of it be carried back to what is likewise matter of dispute, and the decision of that likewise to another disputed point, it will go on ad infinitum , and will be incapable of demonstration. But if the belief of a point that is not admitted be carried back to one admitted by all, that is to be made the commencement of instruction. Every term, therefore, advanced for discussion is to be converted into an expression that is admitted by those that are parties in the discussion, to form the starting point for instruction, to lead the way to the discovery of the points under investigation. For example, let it be the term “sun” that is in question. Now the Stoics say that it is “an intellectual fire kindled from the waters of the sea. ” Is not the definition, consequently, obscurer than the term, requiring another demonstration to prove if it be true? It is therefore better to say, in the common and distinct form of speech, “that the brightest of the heavenly bodies is named the sun. ” For this expression is more credible and clearer, and is likewise admitted by all. Chapter III. —Demonstration Defined. Similarly, also, all men will admit that demonstration is discourse, agreeable to reason, producing belief in points disputed, from points admitted. Now, not only demonstration and belief and knowledge, but foreknowledge also, are used in a twofold manner. There is that which is scientific and certain, and that which is merely based on hope. In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which produces in the souls of learners scientific belief. The other kind is that which merely leads to opinion. As also, both he that is really a man, possessing common judgment, and he that is savage and brutal,—each is a man. Thus also the Comic poet said that “man is graceful, so long as he is man. ” The same holds with ox, horse, and dog, according to the goodness or badness of the animal. For by looking to the perfection of the genus, we come to those meanings that are strictly proper. For instance, we conceive of a physician who is deficient in no element of the power of healing, and a Gnostic who is defective in no element of scientific knowledge. Now demonstration differs from syllogism; inasmuch as the point demonstrated is indicative of one thing, being one and identical; as we say that to be with child is the proof of being no longer a virgin. But what is apprehended by syllogism, though one thing, follows from several; as, for example, not one but several proofs are adduced of Pytho having betrayed the Byzantines, if such was the fact. And to draw a conclusion from what is admitted is to syllogize; while to draw a conclusion from what is true is to demonstrate . So that there is a compound advantage of demonstration: from its assuming, for the proof of points in question, true premisses, and from its drawing the conclusion that follows from them. If the first have no existence, but the second follow from the first, one has not demonstrated, but syllogized. For, to draw the proper conclusion from the premisses, is merely to syllogize. But to have also each of the premisses true, is not merely to have syllogized, but also to have demonstrated.

And to conclude, as is evident from the word, is to bring to the conclusion. And in every train of reasoning, the point sought to be determined is the end, which is also called the conclusion. But no simple and primary statement is termed a syllogism, although true; but it is compounded of three such, at the least,—of two as premisses, and one as conclusion. Now, either all things require demonstration, or some of them are self-evident. But if the first, by demanding the demonstration of each demonstration we shall go on ad infinitum; and so demonstration is subverted. But if the second, those things which are self-evident will become the starting points [and fundamental grounds] of demonstration. In point of fact, the philosophers admit that the first principles of all things are indemonstrable. So that if there is demonstration at all, there is an absolute necessity that there be something that is self-evident, which is called primary and indemonstrable. Consequently all demonstration is traced up to indemonstrable faith. It will also turn out that there are other starting points for demonstrations, after the source which takes its rise in faith,—the things which appear clearly to sensation and understanding. For the phenomena of sensation are simple, and incapable of being decompounded; but those of understanding are simple, rational, and primary. But those produced from them are compound, but no less clear and reliable, and having more to do with the reasoning faculty than the first. For therefore the peculiar native power of reason, which we all have by nature, deals with agreement and disagreement. If, then, any argument be found to be of such a kind, as from points already believed to be capable of producing belief in what is not yet believed, we shall aver that this is the very essence of demonstration. Now it is affirmed that the nature of demonstration, as that of belief, is twofold: that which produces in the souls of the hearers persuasion merely, and that which produces knowledge. If, then, one begins with the things which are evident to sensation and understanding, and then draw the proper conclusion, he truly demonstrates. But if [he begin] with things which are only probable and not primary, that is evident neither to sense nor understanding, and if he draw the right conclusion, he will syllogize indeed, but not produce a scientific demonstration; but if [he draw] not the right conclusion, he will not syllogize at all. Now demonstration differs from analysis. For each one of the points demonstrated, is demonstrated by means of points that are demonstrated; those having been previously demonstrated by others; till we get back to those which are self-evident, or to those evident to sense and to understanding; which is called Analysis. But demonstration is, when the point in question reaches us through all the intermediate steps. The man, then, who practices demonstration, ought to give great attention to the truth, while he disregards the terms of the premisses, whether you call them axioms, or premisses, or assumptions. Similarly, also, special attention must be paid to what suppositions a conclusion is based on; while he may be quite careless as to whether one choose to term it a conclusive or syllogistic proposition. For I assert that these two things must be attended to by the man who would demonstrate—to assume true premisses, and to draw from them the legitimate conclusion, which some also call “the inference,” as being what is inferred from the premisses.

Now in each proposition respecting a question there must be different premisses, related, however, to the proposition laid down; and what is advanced must be reduced to definition. And this definition must be admitted by all. But when premisses irrelevant to the proposition to be established are assumed, it is impossible to arrive at any right result; the entire proposition—which is also called the question of its nature—being ignored. In all questions, then, there is something which is previously known,—that which being self-evident is believed without demonstration; which must be made the starting point in their investigation, and the criterion of apparent results. Chapter IV. —To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. For every question is solved from pre-existing knowledge. And the knowledge pre-existing of each object of investigation is sometimes merely of the essence, while its functions are unknown (as of stones, and plants, and animals, of whose operations we are ignorant), or [the knowledge] of the properties, or powers, or (so to speak) of the qualities inherent in the objects. And sometimes we may know some one or more of those powers or properties,—as, for example, the desires and affections of the soul,—and be ignorant of the essence, and make it the object of investigation. But in many instances, our understanding having assumed all these, the question is, in which of the essences do they thus inhere; for it is after forming conceptions of both—that is, both of essence and operation—in our mind, that we proceed to the question. And there are also some objects, whose operations, along with their essences, we know, but are ignorant of their modifications. Such, then, is the method of the discovery [of truth]. For we must begin with the knowledge of the questions to be discussed. For often the form of the expression deceives and confuses and disturbs the mind, so that it is not easy to discover to what class the thing is to be referred; as, for example, whether the fœtus be an animal. For, having a conception of an animal and a fœtus, we inquire if it be the case that the fœtus is an animal; that is, if the substance which is in the fœtal state possesses the power of motion, and of sensation besides. So that the inquiry is regarding functions and sensations in a substance previously known. Consequently the man who proposes the question is to be first asked, what he calls an animal. Especially is this to be done whenever we find the same term applied to various purposes; and we must examine whether what is signified by the term is disputed, or admitted by all. For were one to say that he calls whatever grows and is fed an animal, we shall have again to ask further, whether he considered plants to be animals; and then, after declaring himself to this effect, he must show what it is which is in the fœtal state, and is nourished. For Plato calls plants animals, as partaking of the third species of life alone, that of appetency. But Aristotle, while he thinks that plants are possessed of a life of vegetation and nutrition, does not consider it proper to call them animals; for that alone, which possesses the other life—that of sensation—he considers warrantable to be called an animal. The Stoics do not call the power of vegetation, life. Now, on the man who proposes the question denying that plants are animals, we shall show that he affirms what contradicts himself.

For, having defined the animal by the fact of its nourishment and growth, but having asserted that a plant is not an animal, it appears that he says nothing else than that what is nourished and grows is both an animal and not an animal. Let him, then, say what he wants to learn. Is it whether what is in the womb grows and is nourished, or is it whether it possesses any sensation or movement by impulse? For, according to Plato, the plant is animate, and an animal; but, according to Aristotle, not an animal, for it wants sensation, but is animate. Therefore, according to him, an animal is an animate sentient being. But according to the Stoics, a plant is neither animate nor an animal; for an animal is an animate being. If, then, an animal is animate, and life is sentient nature, it is plain that what is animate is sentient. If, then, he who has put the question, being again interrogated if he still calls the animal in the fœtal state an animal on account of its being nourished and growing, he has got his answer. But were he to say that the question he asks is, whether the fœtus is already sentient, or capable of moving itself in consequence of any impulse, the investigation of the matter becomes clear, the fallacy in the name no longer remaining. But if he do not reply to the interrogation, and will not say what he means, or in respect of what consideration it is that he applies the term “animal” in propounding the question, but bids us define it ourselves, let him be noted as disputatious. But as there are two methods, one by question and answer, and the other the method of exposition, if he decline the former, let him listen to us, while we expound all that bears on the problem. Then when we have done, he may treat of each point in turn. But if he attempt to interrupt the investigation by putting questions, he plainly does not want to hear. But if he choose to reply, let him first be asked, To what thing he applies the name, animal. And when he has answered this, let him be again asked, what, in his view, the fœtus means, whether that which is in the womb, or things already formed and living; and again, if the fœtus means the seed deposited, or if it is only when members and a shape are formed that the name of embryos is to be applied. And on his replying to this, it is proper that the point in hand be reasoned out to a conclusion, in due order, and taught. But if he wishes us to speak without him answering, let him hear. Since you will not say in what sense you allege what you have propounded (for I would not have thus engaged in a discussion about meanings, but I would now have looked at the things themselves), know that you have done just as if you had propounded the question, Whether a dog were an animal? For I might have rightly said, Of what dog do you speak? For I shall speak of the land dog and the sea dog, and the constellation in heaven, and of Diogenes too, and all the other dogs in order. For I could not divine whether you inquire about all or about some one. What you shall do subsequently is to learn now, and say distinctly what it is that your question is about.

Now if you are shuffling about names, it is plain to everybody that the name fœtus is neither an animal nor a plant, but a name, and a sound, and a body, and a being, and anything and everything rather than an animal. And if it is this that you have propounded, you are answered. But neither is that which is denoted by the name fœtus an animal. But that is incorporeal, and may be called a thing and a notion, and everything rather than an animal. The nature of an animal is different. For it was clearly shown respecting the very point in question, I mean the nature of the embryo, of what sort it is. The question respecting the meanings expressed by the name animal is different. I say, then, if you affirm that an animal is what has the power of sensation and of moving itself from appetency, that an animal is not simply what moves through appetency and is possessed of sensation. For it is also capable of sleeping, or, when the objects of sensation are not present, of not exercising the power of sensation. But the natural power of appetency or of sensation is the mark of an animal. For something of this nature is indicated by these things. First, if the fœtus is not capable of sensation or motion from appetency; which is the point proposed for consideration. Another point is; if the fœtus is capable of ever exercising the power of sensation or moving through appetency. In which sense no one makes it a question, since it is evident. But the question was, whether the embryo is already an animal, or still a plant. And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an animal by sensation and motion from appetency; we again separated this from its adjuncts; asserting that it was one thing for that to be such potentially, which is not yet possessed of the power of sensation and motion, but will some time be so, and another thing to be already so actually; and in the case of such, it is one thing to exert its powers, another to be able to exert them, but to be at rest or asleep. And this is the question. For the embryo is not to be called an animal from the fact that it is nourished; which is the allegation of those who turn aside from the essence of the question, and apply their minds to what happens otherwise. But in the case of all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration is applied in common, which is discourse ( λόγος ), establishing one thing from others. But the grounds from which the point in question is to be established, must be admitted and known by the learner. And the foundation of all these is what is evident to sense and to intellect. Accordingly the primary demonstration is composed of all these. But the demonstration which, from points already demonstrated thereby, concludes some other point, is no less reliable than the former. It cannot be termed primary, because the conclusion is not drawn from primary principles as premisses. The first species, then, of the different kinds of questions, which are three, has been exhibited—I mean that, in which the essence being known, some one of its powers or properties is unknown.

The second variety of propositions was that in which we all know the powers and properties, but do not know the essence; as, for example, in what part of the body is the principal faculty of the soul. Chapter V. —Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment. Now the same treatment which applies to demonstration applies also to the following question. Some, for instance, say that there cannot be several originating causes for one animal. It is impossible that there can be several homogeneous originating causes of an animal; but that there should be several heterogeneous, is not absurd. Suppose the Pyrrhonian suspense of judgment, as they say, [the idea] that nothing is certain: it is plain that, beginning with itself, it first invalidates itself. It either grants that something is true, that you are not to suspend your judgment on all things; or it persists in saying that there is nothing true. And it is evident, that first it will not be true. For it either affirms what is true or it does not affirm what is true. But if it affirms what is true, it concedes, though unwillingly, that something is true. And if it does not affirm what is true, it leaves true what it wished to do away with. For, in so far as the scepticism which demolishes is proved false, in so far the positions which are being demolished, are proved true; like the dream which says that all dreams are false. For in confuting itself, it is confirmatory of the others. And, in fine, if it is true, it will make a beginning with itself, and not be scepticism of anything else but of itself first. Then if [such a man] apprehends that he is a man, or that he is sceptical, it is evident that he is not sceptical. And how shall he reply to the interrogation? For he is evidently no sceptic in respect to this. Nay, he affirms even that he does doubt. And if we must be persuaded to suspend our judgment in regard to everything, we shall first suspend our judgment in regard to our suspense of judgment itself, whether we are to credit it or not. And if this position is true, that we do not know what is true, then absolutely nothing is allowed to be true by it. But if he will say that even this is questionable, whether we know what is true; by this very statement he grants that truth is knowable, in the very act of appearing to establish the doubt respecting it. But if a philosophical sect is a leaning toward dogmas, or, according to some, a leaning to a number of dogmas which have consistency with one another and with phenomena, tending to a right life; and dogma is a logical conception, and conception is a state and assent of the mind: not merely sceptics, but every one who dogmatizes is accustomed in certain things to suspend his judgment, either through want of strength of mind, or want of clearness in the things, or equal force in the reasons. Chapter VI. —Definitions, Genera, and Species. The introductions and sources of questions are about these points and in them. But before definitions, and demonstrations, and divisions, it must be propounded in what ways the question is stated; and equivocal terms are to be treated; and synomyms stated accurately according to their significations. Then it is to be inquired whether the proposition belongs to those points, which are considered in relation to others, or is taken by itself.

Further, If it is, what it is, what happens to it; or thus, also, if it is, what it is, why it is. And to the consideration of these points, the knowledge of Particulars and Universals, and the Antecedents and the Differences, and their divisions, contribute. Now, Induction aims at generalization and definition; and the divisions are the species, and what a thing is, and the individual. The contemplation of the How adduces the assumption of what is peculiar; and doubts bring the particular differences and the demonstrations, and otherwise augment the speculation and its consequences; and the result of the whole is scientific knowledge and truth. Again, the summation resulting from Division becomes Definition. For Definition is adopted before division and after: before, when it is admitted or stated; after, when it is demonstrated. And by Sensation the Universal is summed up from the Particular. For the starting point of Induction is Sensation; and the end is the Universal. Induction, accordingly, shows not what a thing is, but that it is, or is not. Division shows what it is; and Definition similarly with Division teaches the essence and what a thing is, but not if it is; while Demonstration explains the three points, if it is, what it is, and why it is. There are also Definitions which contain the Cause. And since it may be known when we see, when we see the Cause; and Causes are four—the matter, the moving power, the species, the end; Definition will be fourfold. Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the “What it is. ” There is no necessity for expressing all the differences of each thing, but those which form the species. Geometrical analysis and synthesis are similar to logical division and definition; and by division we get back to what is simple and more elementary. We divide, therefore, the genus of what is proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the case of man, we divide animal, which is the genus, into the species that appear in it, the mortal, and the immortal. And thus, by continually dividing those genera that seem to be compound into the simpler species, we arrive at the point which is the subject of investigation, and which is incapable of further division. For, after dividing “the animal” into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those who walk; and so dividing the species which is nearest to what is sought, which also contains what is sought, we arrive by division at the simplest species, which contains nothing else, but what is sought alone. For again we divide that which walks into rational and irrational; and then selecting from the species, apprehended by division, those next to man, and combining them into one formula, we state the definition of a man, who is an animal, mortal, terrestrial, walking, rational. Whence Division furnishes the class of matter, seeking for the definition the simplicity of the name; and the definition of the artisan and maker, by composition and construction, presents the knowledge of the thing as it is; not of those things of which we have general notions. To these notions we say that explanatory expressions belong. For to these notions, also, divisions are applicable.

Now one Division divides that which is divided into species, as a genus; and another into parts, as a whole; and another into accidents. The division, then, of a whole into the parts, is, for the most part, conceived with reference to magnitude; that into the accidents can never be entirely explicated, if, necessarily, essence is inherent in each of the existences. Whence both these divisions are to be rejected, and only the division of the genus into species is approved, by which both the identity that is in the genus is characterized, and the diversity which subsists in the specific differences. The species is always contemplated in a part. On the other hand, however, if a thing is part of another, it will not be also a species. For the hand is a part of a man, but it is not a species. And the genus exists in the species. For [the genus] is both in man and the ox. But the whole is not in the parts. For the man is not in his feet. Wherefore also the species is more important than the part; and whatever things are predicated of the genus will be all predicated of the species. It is best, then, to divide the genus into two, if not into three species. The species then being divided more generically, are characterized by sameness and difference. And then being divided, they are characterized by the points generically indicated. For each of the species is either an essence; as when we say, Some substances are corporeal and some incorporeal; or how much, or what relation, or where, or when, or doing, or suffering. One, therefore, will give the definition of whatever he possesses the knowledge of; as one can by no means be acquainted with that which he cannot embrace and define in speech. And in consequence of ignorance of the definition, the result is, that many disputes and deceptions arise. For if he that knows the thing has the knowledge of it in his mind, and can explain by words what he conceives; and if the explanation of the thought is definition; then he that knows the thing must of necessity be able also to give the definition. Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to the definition of man, makes the whole—a rational, mortal, terrestrial, walking, laughing animal. For the things added by way of difference to the definition are the signs of the properties of things; but do not show the nature of the things themselves. Now they say that the difference is the assigning of what is peculiar; and as that which has the difference differs from all the rest, that which belongs to it alone, and is predicated conversely of the thing, must in definitions be assumed by the first genus as principal and fundamental. Accordingly, in the larger definitions the number of the species that are discovered are in the ten Categories; and in the least, the principal points of the nearest species being taken, mark the essence and nature of the thing. But the least consists of three, the genus and two essentially necessary species. And this is done for the sake of brevity. We say, then, Man is the laughing animal. And we must assume that which pre-eminently happens to what is defined, or its peculiar virtue, or its peculiar function, and the like. Accordingly, while the definition is explanatory of the essence of the thing, it is incapable of accurately comprehending its nature.

By means of the principal species, the definition makes an exposition of the essence, and almost has the essence in the quality. Chapter VII. —On the Causes of Doubt or Assent. The causes productive of scepticism are two things principally. One is the changefulness and instability of the human mind, whose nature it is to generate dissent, either that of one with another, or that of people with themselves. And the second is the discrepancy which is in things; which, as to be expected, is calculated to be productive of scepticism. For, being unable either to believe in all views, on account of their conflicting nature; or to disbelieve all, because that which says that all are untrustworthy is included in the number of those that are so; or to believe some and disbelieve others on account of the equipoise, we are led to scepticism. But among the principal causes of scepticism is the instability of the mind, which is productive of dissent. And dissent is the proximate cause of doubt. Whence life is full of tribunals and councils; and, in fine, of selection in what is said to be good and bad; which are the signs of a mind in doubt, and halting through feebleness on account of conflicting matters. And there are libraries full of books, and compilations and treatises of those who differ in dogmas, and are confident that they themselves know the truth that there is in things. Chapter VIII. —The Method of Classifying Things and Names. In language there are three things:—Names, which are primarily the symbols of conceptions, and by consequence also of subjects. Second, there are Conceptions, which are the likenesses and impressions of the subjects. Whence in all, the conceptions are the same; in consequence of the same impression being produced by the subjects in all. But the names are not so, on account of the difference of languages. And thirdly, the Subject-matters by which the Conceptions are impressed in us. The names are reduced by grammar into the twenty-four general elements; for the elements must be determined. For of Particulars there is no scientific knowledge, seeing they are infinite. But it is the property of science to rest on general and defined principles. Whence also Particulars are resolved into Universals. And philosophic research is occupied with Conceptions and Real subjects. But since of these the Particulars are infinite, some elements have been found, under which every subject of investigation is brought; and if it be shown to enter into any one or more of the elements, we prove it to exist; but if it escape them all, that it does not exist. Of things stated, some are stated without connection; as, for example, “man” and “runs,” and whatever does not complete a sentence, which is either true or false. And of things stated in connection, some point out “essence,” some “quality,” some “quantity,” some “relation,” some “where,” some “when,” some “position,” some “possession,” some “action,” some “suffering,” which we call the elements of material things after the first principles. For these are capable of being contemplated by reason. But immaterial things are capable of being apprehended by the mind alone, by primary application. And of those things that are classed under the ten Categories, some are predicated by themselves (as the nine Categories), and others in relation to something. And, again, of the things contained under these ten Categories, some are Univocal, as ox and man, as far as each is an animal.

For those are Univocal terms, to both of which belongs the common name, animal; and the same principle, that is definition, that is animate essence. And Heteronyms are those which relate to the same subject under different names, as ascent or descent; for the way is the same whether upwards or downwards. And the other species of Heteronyms, as horse and black, are those which have a different name and definition from each other, and do not possess the same subject. But they are to be called different, not Heteronyms. And Polyonyms are those which have the same definition, but a different name, as, hanger, sword, scimitar. And Paronyms are those which are named from something different, as “manly” from “manliness. ” Equivocal terms have the same name, but not the same definition, as man—both the animal and the picture. Of Equivocal terms, some receive their Equivocal name fortuitously, as Ajax, the Locrian, and the Salaminian; and some from intention; and of these, some from resemblance, as man both the living and the painted; and some from analogy, as the foot of Mount Ida, and our foot, because they are beneath; some from action, as the foot of a vessel, by which the vessel sails, and our foot, by which we move. Equivocal terms are designated from the same and to the same; as the book and scalpel are called surgical, both from the surgeon who uses them and with reference to the surgical matter itself. Chapter IX. —On the Different Kinds of Cause. Of Causes, some are Procatarctic and some Synectic, some Co-operating, some Causes sine quâ non. Those that afford the occasion of the origin of anything first, are Procatarctic; as beauty is the cause of love to the licentious; for when seen by them, it alone produces the amorous inclination, but not necessarily. Causes are Synectic (which are also univocally perfect of themselves) whenever a cause is capable of producing the effect of itself, independently. Now all the causes may be shown in order in the case of the learner. The father is the Procatarctic cause of learning, the teacher the Synectic, and the nature of the learner the cooperating cause, and time holds the relation of the Cause sine quâ non. Now that is properly called a cause which is capable of effecting anything actively; since we say that steel is capable of cutting, not merely while cutting, but also while not cutting. Thus, then, the capability of causing ( τὸ παρεκτικόν ) signifies both; both that which is now acting, and that which is not yet acting, but which possesses the power of acting. Some, then, say that causes are properties of bodies; and others of incorporeal substances; others say that the body is properly speaking cause, and that what is incorporeal is so only catachrestically, and a quasi-cause. Others, again, reverse matters, saying that corporeal substances are properly causes, and bodies are so improperly; as, for example, that cutting, which is an action, is incorporeal, and is the cause of cutting which is an action and incorporeal, and, in the case of bodies, of being cut,—as in the case of the sword and what is cut [by it]. The cause of things is predicated in a threefold manner. One, What the cause is, as the statuary; a second, Of what it is the cause of becoming, a statue; and a third, To what it is the cause, as, for example, the material: for he is the cause to the brass of becoming a statue.

The being produced, and the being cut, which are causes to what they belong, being actions, are incorporeal. According to which principle, causes belong to the class of predicates ( κατηγορημάτων ), or, as others say, of dicta ( λεκτῶν ) (for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates dicta ); or rather, some causes will be assigned to the class of predicates, as that which is cut, whose case is to be cut; and some to that of axioms,—as, for example, that of a ship being made, whose case again is, that a ship is constructing. Now Aristotle denominates the name of such things as a house, a ship, burning, cutting, an appellative. But the case is allowed to be incorporeal. Therefore that sophism is solved thus: What you say passes through your mouth. Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes through your mouth. Which is false. For we do not speak the house, which is a body, but the case, in which the house is, which is incorporeal. And we say that the house-builder builds the house, in reference to that which is to be produced. So we say that the cloak is woven; for that which makes is the indication of the operation. That which makes is not the attribute of one, and the cause that of another, but of the same, both in the case of the cloak and of the house. For, in as far as one is the cause of anything being produced, in so far is he also the maker of it. Consequently, the cause, and that which makes, and that through which ( δἰ ὅ ), are the same. Now, if anything is “a cause” and “that which effects,” it is certainly also “that through which. ” But if a thing is “that through which,” it does not by any means follow that it is also “the cause. ” Many things, for instance, concur in one result, through which the end is reached; but all are not causes. For Medea would not have killed her children, had she not been enraged. Nor would she have been enraged, had she not been jealous. Nor would she have been this, if she had not loved. Nor would she have loved, had not Jason sailed to Colchi. Nor would this have taken place, had the Argo not been built. Nor would this have taken place, had not the timbers been cut from Pelion. For though in all these things there is the case of “that through which,” they are not all “causes” of the murder of the children, but only Medea was the cause. Wherefore, that which does not hinder does not act. Wherefore, that which does not hinder is not a cause, but that which hinders is. For it is in acting and doing something that the cause is conceived. Besides, what does not hinder is separated from what takes place; but the cause is related to the event. That, therefore, which does not hinder cannot be a cause. Wherefore, then, it is accomplished, because that which can hinder is not present. Causation is then predicated in four ways: The efficient cause, as the statuary; and the material, as the brass; and the form, as the character; and the end, as the honour of the Gymnasiarch. The relation of the cause sine quâ non is held by the brass in reference to the production of the statue; and likewise it is a [true] cause.

For everything without which the effect is incapable of being produced, is of necessity a cause; but a cause not absolutely. For the cause sine quâ non is not Synectic, but Co-operative. And everything that acts produces the effect, in conjunction with the aptitude of that which is acted on. For the cause disposes. But each thing is affected according to its natural constitution; the aptitude being causative, and occupying the place of causes sine quâ non . Accordingly, the cause is inefficacious without the aptitude; and is not a cause, but a co-efficient. For all causation is conceived in action. Now the earth could not make itself, so that it could not be the cause of itself. And it were ridiculous to say that the fire was not the cause of the burning, but the logs,—or the sword of the cutting, but the flesh,—or the strength of the antagonist the cause of the athlete being vanquished, but his own weakness. The Synectic cause does not require time. For the cautery produces pain at the instant of its application to the flesh. Of Procatarctic causes, some require time till the effect be produced, and others do not require it, as the case of fracture. Are not these called independent of time, not by way of privation, but of diminution, as that which is sudden, not that which has taken place without time? Every cause, apprehended by the mind as a cause, is occupied with something, and is conceived in relation to something; that is, some effect, as the sword for cutting; and to some object, as possessing an aptitude, as the fire to the wood. For it will not burn steel. The cause belongs to the things which have relation to something. For it is conceived in its relation to another thing. So that we apply our minds to the two, that we may conceive the cause as a cause. The same relation holds with the creator, and maker, and father. A thing is not the cause of itself. Nor is one his own father. For so the first would become the second. Now the cause acts and affects. That which is produced by the cause is acted on and is affected. But the same thing taken by itself cannot both act and be affected, nor can one be son and father. And otherwise the cause precedes in being what is done by it, as the sword, the cutting. And the same thing cannot precede at the same instant as to matter, as it is a cause, and at the same time, also, be after and posterior as the effect of a cause. Now being differs from becoming , as the cause from the effect, the father from the son. For the same thing cannot both be and become at the same instant; and consequently it is not the cause of itself. Things are not causes of one another, but causes to each other. For the splenetic affection preceding is not the cause of fever, but of the occurrence of fever; and the fever which precedes is not the cause of spleen, but of the affection increasing. Thus also the virtues are causes to each other, because on account of their mutual correspondence they cannot be separated. And the stones in the arch are causes of its continuing in this category, but are not the causes of one another. And the teacher and the learner are to one another causes of progressing as respects the predicate.

And mutual and reciprocal causes are predicated, some of the same things, as the merchant and the retailer are causes of gain; and sometimes one of one thing and others of another, as the sword and the flesh; for the one is the cause to the flesh of being cut, and the flesh to the sword of cutting. [It is well said,] “An eye for an eye, life for life. ” For he who has wounded another mortally, is the cause to him of death, or of the occurrence of death. But on being mortally wounded by him in turn, he has had him as a cause in turn, not in respect of being a cause to him, but in another respect. For he becomes the cause of death to him, not that it was death returned the mortal stroke, but the wounded man himself. So that he was the cause of one thing, and had another cause. And he who has done wrong becomes the cause to another, to him who has been wronged. But the law which enjoins punishment to be inflicted is the cause not of injury, but to the one of retribution, to the other of discipline. So that the things which are causes, are not causes to each other as causes. It is still asked, if many things in conjunction become many causes of one thing. For the men who pull together are the causes of the ship being drawn down; but along with others, unless what is a joint cause be a cause. Others say, if there are many causes, each by itself becomes the cause of one thing. For instance, the virtues, which are many, are causes of happiness, which is one; and of warmth and pain, similarly, the causes are many. Are not, then, the many virtues one in power, and the sources of warmth and of pain so, also? and does not the multitude of the virtues, being one in kind, become the cause of the one result, happiness? But, in truth, Procatarctic causes are more than one both generically and specifically; as, for example, cold, weakness, fatigue, dyspepsia, drunkenness, generically, of any disease; and specifically, of fever. But Synectic causes are so, generically alone, and not also specifically. For of pleasant odour, which is one thing genetically, there are many specific causes, as frankincense, rose, crocus, styrax, myrrh, ointment. For the rose has not the same kind of sweet fragrance as myrrh. And the same thing becomes the cause of contrary effects; sometimes through the magnitude of the cause and its power, and sometimes in consequence of the susceptibility of that on which it acts. According to the nature of the force, the same string, according to its tension or relaxation, gives a shrill or deep sound. And honey is sweet to those who are well, and bitter to those who are in fever, according to the state of susceptibility of those who are affected. And one and the same wine inclines some to rage, and others to merriment. And the same sun melts wax and hardens clay. Further, of causes, some are apparent; others are grasped by a process of reasoning; others are occult; others are inferred analogically. And of causes that are occult, some are occult temporarily, being hidden at one time, and at another again seen clearly; and some are occult by nature, and capable of becoming at no time visible.

And of those who are so by nature, some are capable of being apprehended; and these some would not call occult, being apprehended by analogy, through the medium of signs, as, for example, the symmetry of the passages of the senses, which are contemplated by reason. And some are not capable of being apprehended; which cannot in any mode fall under apprehension; which are by their very definition occult. Now some are Procatarctic, some Synectic, some Joint-causes, some Co-operating causes. And there are some according to nature, some beyond nature. And there are some of disease and by accident, some of sensations, some of the greatness of these, some of times and of seasons. Procatarctic causes being removed, the effect remains. But a Synectic cause is that, which being present, the effect remains, and being removed, the effect is removed. The Synectic is also called by the synonymous expression “perfect in itself. ” Since it is of itself sufficient to produce the effect. And if the cause manifests an operation sufficient in itself, the co-operating cause indicates assistance and service along with the other. If, accordingly, it effects nothing, it will not be called even a co-operating cause; and if it does effect something, it is wholly the cause of this, that is, of what is produced by it. That is, then, a co-operating cause, which being present, the effect was produced—the visible visibly, and the occult invisibly. The Joint-cause belongs also to the genus of causes, as a fellow-soldier is a soldier, and as a fellow-youth is a youth. The Co-operating cause further aids the Synectic, in the way of intensifying what is produced by it. But the Joint-cause does not fall under the same notion. For a thing may be a Joint-cause, though it be not a Synectic cause. For the Joint-cause is conceived in conjunction with another, which is not capable of producing the effect by itself, being a cause along with a cause. And the Co-operating cause differs from the Joint-cause in this particular, that the Joint-cause produces the effect in that which by itself does not act. But the Co-operating cause, while effecting nothing by itself, yet by its accession to that which acts by itself, co-operates with it, in order to the production of the effect in the intensest degree. But especially is that which becomes co-operating from being Procatarctic, effective in intensifying the force of the cause. Elucidations. I. (Scripture, cap. i. p. 558 . ) On the 18th of July, 1870, Pius the Ninth, by the bull Pastor Æternus proclaiming himself infallible, and defining that every Roman bishop from the times of the apostles were equally so, placed himself in conflict, not merely with Holy Scripture (which repeatedly proves the fallibility of St. Peter himself, when speaking apart from his fellow-apostles), but with the torrent of all antiquity. Yes, and with the great divines of his own communion, such as Bossuet; including divers pontiffs, and the Gallicans generally. But note, here, what St. Clement says of the Holy Scripture, and of the search after truth. Is it conceivable, that he knew of any living infallible oracle, when he wrote this book, never once hinting the existence of any such source of absolute gnostic perfection? A like ignorance of such an oracle characterizes Vincent of Lerins, the great expounder of the rule of faith as understood by the four great councils of antiquity. Clearly, Clement had never seen in Irenæus the meaning read into his words by the modern flatterers of the Roman See.

The discovery of 1870 comes just eighteen centuries too late for practical purposes. II. (Of Book the Eighth, note 1 , p. 567. ) In the place of this book, according to some mss. , Photius found the tract τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος ; in other mss . , a book beginning as this does. He accused the Stromata of unsound opinions; but, this censure not being supported by anything we possess, some imagine that the eighth book is lost, and that it is no great loss after all. A rash judgment as to its value; but possibly this, which is called the eighth book, is from the lost Hypotyposes . Kaye’s suggestion is, that, as the seventh book closed with a promise of something quite fresh, we may discover it in this contribution towards forming his Gnostic, to further knowledge. It should be regarded as of great importance, that Christianity appears as the friend of all knowledge, and of human culture, from the very start. To our author’s versatile genius, much credit is due for the elements out of which Christian universities took their rise.

Fragments of Clemens Alexandrinus. [Translated by Rev. William Wilson, M. A. ] I. —From the Latin Translation of Cassiodorus. I. —Comments On the First Epistle of Peter . Chap. i. 3. “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who by His great mercy hath regenerated us. ” For if God generated us of matter, He afterwards, by progress in life, regenerated us. “The Father of our Lord, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ:” who, according to your faith, rises again in us; as, on the other hand, He dies in us, through the operation of our unbelief. For He said again, that the soul never returns a second time to the body in this life; and that which has become angelic does not become unrighteous or evil, so as not to have the opportunity of again sinning by the assumption of flesh; but that in the resurrection the soul returns to the body, and both are joined to one another according to their peculiar nature, adapting themselves, through the composition of each, by a kind of congruity like a building of stones. Besides, Peter says, “Ye also, as living stones, are built up a spiritual house;” meaning the place of the angelic abode, guarded in heaven . “For you,” he says, “who are kept by the power of God, by faith and contemplation, to receive the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls. ” Hence it appears that the soul is not naturally immortal; but is made immortal by the grace of God, through faith and righteousness, and by knowledge. “Of which salvation,” he says, “the prophets have inquired and searched diligently,” and what follows. It is declared by this that the prophets spake with wisdom, and that the Spirit of Christ was in them, according to the possession of Christ, and in subjection to Christ. For God works through archangels and kindred angels, who are called spirits of Christ. “Which are now,” he says, “reported unto you by them that have preached the Gospel unto you. ” The old things which were done by the prophets and escape the observation of most, are now revealed to you by the evangelists. “For to you,” he says, “they are manifested by the Holy Ghost, who was sent;” that is the Paraclete, of whom the Lord said, “If I go not away, He will not come. ” “Unto whom,” it is said, “the angels desire to look;” not the apostate angels, as most suspect, but, what is a divine truth, angels who desire to obtain the advantage of that perfection. “By precious blood,” he says, “as of a lamb without blemish and without spot. ” Here he touches on the ancient Levitical and sacerdotal celebrations; but means a soul pure through righteousness which is offered to God. “Verily foreknown before the foundation of the world. ” Inasmuch as He was foreknown before every creature, because He was Christ. “But manifested in the last times” by the generation of a body. “Being born again, not of corruptible seed. ” The soul, then, which is produced along with the body is corruptible, as some think. “But the word of the Lord,” he says, “endureth for ever:” as well prophecy as divine doctrine. “But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood. ” That we are a chosen race by the election of God is abundantly clear.

He says royal, because we are called to sovereignty and belong to Christ; and priesthood on account of the oblation which is made by prayers and instructions, by which are gained the souls which are offered to God. “Who, when He was reviled,” he says, “reviled not; when He suffered, threatened not. ” The Lord acted so in His goodness and patience. “But committed Himself to him that judged Him unrighteously:” whether Himself, so that, regarding Himself in this way, there is a transposition. He indeed gave Himself up to those who judged according to an unjust law; because He was unserviceable to them, inasmuch as He was righteous: or, He committed to God those who judged unrighteously, and without cause insisted on His death, so that they might be instructed by suffering punishment. “For he that will love life, and see good days;” that is, who wishes to become eternal and immortal. And He calls the Lord life, and the days good, that is holy. “For the eyes of the Lord,” he says, “are upon the righteous, and His ears on their prayers:” he means the manifold inspection of the Holy Spirit. “The face of the Lord is on them that do evil;” that is, whether judgment, or vengeance, or manifestation. “But sanctify the Lord Christ,” he says, “in your hearts. ” For so you have in the Lord’s prayer, “Hallowed be Thy name. ” “For Christ,” he says, “hath once suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust, that he might present us to God; being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit. ” He says these things, reducing them to their faith. That is, He became alive in our spirits. “Coming,” he says, “He preached to those who were once unbelieving. ” They saw not His form, but they heard His voice. “When the long-suffering of God” holds out. God is so good, as to work the result by the teaching of salvation. “By the resurrection,” it is said, “of Jesus Christ:” that, namely, which is effected in us by faith. “Angels being subjected to Him,” which are the first order; and “principalities” being subject, who are of the second order; and “powers” being also subject, which are said to belong to the third order. “Who shall give account,” he says, “to Him who is ready to judge the quick and the dead. ” These are trained through previous judgments. Therefore he adds, “For this cause was the Gospel preached also to the dead”—to us, namely, who were at one time unbelievers. “That they might be judged according to men,” he says, “in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit. ” Because, that is, they have fallen away from faith; whilst they are still in the flesh they are judged according to preceding judgments, that they might repent. Accordingly, he also adds, saying, “That they might live according to God in the spirit. ” So Paul also; for he, too, states something of this nature when he says, “Whom I have delivered to Satan, that he might live in the spirit;” that is, “as good stewards of the manifold grace of God. ” Similarly also Paul says, “Variously, and in many ways, God of old spake to our fathers. ” “Rejoice,” it is said, “that ye are partakers in the sufferings of Christ:” that is, if ye are righteous, ye suffer for righteousness’ sake, as Christ suffered for righteousness. “Happy are ye, for the Spirit of God, who is the Spirit of His glory and virtue, resteth on you.

” This possessive “His” signifies also an an angelic spirit: inasmuch as the glory of God those are, through whom, according to faith and righteousness, He is glorified, to honourable glory, according to the advancement of the saints who are brought in. “The Spirit of God on us,” may be thus understood; that is, who through faith comes on the soul, like a gracefulness of mind and beauty of soul. “Since,” it is said, “it is time for judgment beginning at the house of God. ” For judgment will overtake these in the appointed persecutions. “But the God of all grace,” he says. “Of all grace,” he says, because He is good, and the giver of all good things. “Marcus, my son, saluteth you. ” Mark, the follower of Peter, while Peter publicly preached the Gospel at Rome before some of Cæsar’s equites, and adduced many testimonies to Christ, in order that thereby they might be able to commit to memory what was spoken, of what was spoken by Peter, wrote entirely what is called the Gospel according to Mark. As Luke also may be recognised by the style, both to have composed the Acts of the Apostles, and to have translated Paul’s Epistle to the Hebrews. II. —Comments on the Epistle of Jude. Jude, who wrote the Catholic Epistle, the brother of the sons of Joseph, and very religious, whilst knowing the near relationship of the Lord, yet did not say that he himself was His brother. But what said he? “Jude, a servant of Jesus Christ,”—of Him as Lord; but “the brother of James. ” For this is true; he was His brother, (the son) of Joseph. “For certain men have entered unawares, ungodly men, who had been of old ordained and predestined to the judgment of our God;” not that they might become impious, but that, being now impious, they were ordained to judgment. “For the Lord God,” he says, “who once delivered a people out of Egypt, afterward destroyed them that believed not;” that is, that He might train them through punishment. For they were indeed punished, and they perished on account of those that are saved, until they turn to the Lord. “But the angels,” he says, “that kept not their own pre-eminence,” that, namely, which they received through advancement, “but left their own habitation,” meaning, that is, the heaven and the stars, became, and are called apostates. “He hath reserved these to the judgment of the great day, in chains, under darkness. ” He means the place near the earth, that is, the dark air. Now he called “chains” the loss of the honour in which they had stood, and the lust of feeble things; since, bound by their own lust, they cannot be converted. “As Sodom and Gomorrha,” he says. … By which the Lord signifies that pardon had been granted; and that on being disciplined they had repented. “Similarly to the same,” he says, “also those dreamers,”—that is, who dream in their imagination lusts and wicked desires, regarding as good not that which is truly good, and superior to all good,—“defile the flesh, despise dominion, and speak evil of majesty,” that is, the only Lord, who is truly our Lord, Jesus Christ, and alone worthy of praise. They “speak evil of majesty,” that is, of the angels. “When Michael, the archangel, disputing with the devil, debated about the body of Moses. ” Here he confirms the assumption of Moses. He is here called Michael, who through an angel near to us debated with the devil.

“But these,” he says, “speak evil of those things which they know not; but what they know naturally, as brute beasts, in these things they corrupt themselves. ” He means that they eat, and drink, and indulge in uncleanness, and says that they do other things that are common to them with animals, devoid of reason. “Woe unto them! ” he says, “for they have gone in the way of Cain. ” For so also we lie under Adam’s sin through similarity of sin. “Clouds,” he says, “without water; who do not possess in themselves the divine and fruitful word. ” Wherefore, he says, “men of this kind are carried about both by winds and violent blasts. ” “Trees,” he says, “of autumn, without fruit,”—unbelievers, that is, who bear no fruit of fidelity. “Twice dead,” he says: once, namely, when they sinned by transgressing, and a second time when delivered up to punishment, according to the predestined judgments of God; inasmuch as it is to be reckoned death, even when each one does not forthwith deserve the inheritance. “Waves,” he says, “of a raging sea. ” By these words he signifies the life of the Gentiles, whose end is abominable ambition. “Wandering stars,”—that is, he means those who err and are apostates are of that kind of stars which fell from the seats of the angels—“to whom,” for their apostasy, “the blackness of darkness is reserved for ever. Enoch also, the seventh from Adam,” he says, “prophesied of these. ” In these words he verities the prophecy. “Those,” he says, “separating” the faithful from the unfaithful, be convicted according to their own unbelief. And again those separating from the flesh. He says, “Animal not having the spirit;” that is, the spirit which is by faith, which supervenes through the practice of righteousness. “But ye, beloved,” he says, “building up yourselves on your most holy faith, in the Holy Spirit. ” “But some,” he says, “save, plucking them from the fire;” “but of some have compassion in fear,” that is, teach those who fall into the fire to free themselves. “Hating,” he says, “that spotted garment, which is carnal:” that of the soul, namely; the spotted garment is a spirit polluternal lusts. “Now to Him,” he says, “who is able to keep you without stumbling, and present you faultless before the presence of His glory in joy. ” In the presence of His glory: he means in the presence of the angels, to be presented faultless, having become angels. When Daniel speaks of the people and comes into the presence of the Lord, he does not say this, because he saw God: for it is impossible that any one whose heart is not pure should see God; but he says this, that everything that the people did was in the sight of God, and was manifest to Him; that is, that nothing is hid from the Lord. Now, in the Gospel according to Mark, the Lord being interrogated by the chief of the priests if He was the Christ, the Son of the blessed God, answering, said, “I am; and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power. ” But powers mean the holy angels. Further, when He says “at the right hand of God,” He means the self-same [beings], by reason of the equality and likeness of the angelic and holy powers, which are called by the name of God. He says, therefore, that He sits at the right hand; that is, that He rests in pre-eminent honour.

In the other Gospels, however, He is said not to have replied to the high priest, on his asking if He was the Son of God. But what said He? “You say. ” Answering sufficiently well. For had He said, It is as you understand, he would have said what was not true, not confessing Himself to be the Son of God; [for] they did not entertain this opinion of Him; but by saying “You say,” He spake truly. For what they had no knowledge of, but expressed in words, that he confessed to be true. III. —Comments on the First Epistle of John. Chap. i. 1 . “That which was from the beginning; which we have seen with our eyes; which we have heard. ” Following the Gospel according to John, and in accordance with it, this Epistle also contains the spiritual principle. What therefore he says, “from the beginning,” the Presbyter explained to this effect, that the beginning of generation is not separated from the beginning of the Creator. For when he says, “That which was from the beginning,” he touches upon the generation without beginning of the Son, who is co-existent with the Father. There was; then, a Word importing an unbeginning eternity; as also the Word itself, that is, the Son of God, who being, by equality of substance, one with the Father, is eternal and uncreate. That He was always the Word, is signified by saying, “In the beginning was the Word. ” But by the expression, “we have seen with our eyes,” he signifies the Lord’s presence in the flesh, “and our hands have handled,” he says, “of the Word of life. ” He means not only His flesh, but the virtues of the Son, like the sunbeam which penetrates to the lowest places,—this sunbeam coming in the flesh became palpable to the disciples. It is accordingly related in traditions, that John, touching the outward body itself, sent his hand deep down into it, and that the solidity of the flesh offered no obstacle, but gave way to the hand of the disciple. “And our hands have handled of the Word of life;” that is, He who came in the flesh became capable of being touched. As also, Ver. 2 . “The life was manifested. ” For in the Gospel he thus speaks: “And what was made, in Him was life, and the life was the light of men. ” “And we show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto you. ” He signifies by the appellation of Father, that the Son also existed always, without beginning. Ver. 5 . “For God,” he says, “is light. ” He does not express the divine essence, but wishing to declare the majesty of God, he has applied to the Divinity what is best and most excellent in the view of men. Thus also Paul, when he speaks of “light inaccessible. ” But John himself also in this same Epistle says, “God is love:” pointing out the excellences of God, that He is kind and merciful; and because He is light, makes men righteous, according to the advancement of the soul, through charity. God, then, who is ineffable in respect of His substance, is light. “And in Him is no darkness at all,”—that is, no passion, no keeping up of evil respecting any one, [He] destroys no one, but gives salvation to all. Light moreover signifies, either the precepts of the Law, or faith, or doctrine. Darkness is the opposite of these things.